February 23, 2026
Mr. Casten (for himself, Ms. Dean of Pennsylvania, Ms. Escobar, Mr. Deluzio, Ms. Balint, Mr. McGovern, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Khanna, Mr. Garamendi, Mr. Beyer, Ms. Tokuda, Mr. Doggett, Mrs. Foushee, Mr. Thompson of California, Ms. Garcia of Texas, Ms. Matsui, Mr. Tran, Ms. Randall, Mr. Huffman, Mr. Takano, Mr. Carter of Louisiana, Ms. Pingree, Mrs. Watson Coleman, Ms. Kaptur, Ms. McCollum, and Mr. Castro of Texas) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs
To prohibit the use of United States-origin defense articles in the West Bank and Gaza unless certain conditions are met, and for other purposes.
Section 1. Short title
This Act may be cited as the Ceasefire Compliance Act of 2026
.
Sec. 2. Findings; statement of policy
(a) Findings
Congress makes the following findings:
(1)
On October 7, 2023, Hamas conducted a brutal and horrific attack against the people of Israel, killing more than 1,200 people, the vast majority of whom were civilians, and took more than 250 individuals hostage.
(2)
Following the attack, the United States assisted directly with the defense of Israel, including through defensive air capabilities, weapons, equipment, and related assistance to counter and deter regional threats, demonstrating the United States commitment to Israel’s security.
(3)
Hamas has been severely degraded militarily and currently lacks the ability to conduct a sustained attack against Israel similar in scope to October 7, but still maintains a presence in Gaza and recruited new militants during the Israel-Hamas war.
(4)
The best path forward to make a weakened Hamas no longer able to rule Gaza or threaten Israel is by replacing it with an alternative security and governance mechanism that benefits the civilians of Gaza.
(5)
Israel’s military operations in and policies toward Gaza between October 2023 and February 2026 have killed over 70,000 Palestinians, a majority of whom were civilians, and created an acute humanitarian crisis, including famine in parts of the territory in 2025.
(6)
The United States helped negotiate a ceasefire and hostage release agreement between Israel and Hamas on October 10, 2025, that freed the remaining hostages, provided much needed humanitarian aid to Palestinians in Gaza, and laid the groundwork for a broader regional peace through a 20-point plan.
(7)
Violence and instability in the West Bank, including settler violence, acts of de facto annexation, such as the establishment of illegal outposts and their retroactive legalization by the Israeli government, and broad threats of de jure annexation, undermine the foreign policy objectives of the United States, threaten to derail the ceasefire in Gaza, are detrimental to Israel’s security, and harm prospects for broader regional peace and a future Palestinian state.
(8)
Settler violence in the West Bank directed against Palestinians, including attacks on civilians and property destruction, reached record high levels in 2025.
(b) Statement of policy
It is the policy of the United States—
(1)
to use all diplomatic tools to maintain the October 10, 2025, ceasefire agreement and advance the steps outlined in the 20-point plan to ensure security, freedom, and dignity for Israelis and Palestinians alike;
(2)
to affirm that sustained compliance by Hamas with the October 10, 2025, ceasefire agreement is essential, including by ceasing attacks, rearmament, and the rebuilding of military infrastructure, agreeing to a plan for step-by-step disarmament and refraining from conduct that undermines the ceasefire;
(3)
to support the United Nations, ceasefire mediators, and the broader international community in fully implementing United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803, and to oppose the use of the Board of Peace to undermine or replace the role of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security;
(4)
to support an immediate and continued surge in humanitarian assistance, provided by organizations that adhere to the core humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence, as well as to ensure sufficient access to aid within Gaza to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip;
(5)
to help facilitate credible and transparent Palestinian governance and security institutions in the Gaza Strip that can act as viable alternatives to Hamas and lead to its disarmament;
(6)
to bring about conditions for a viable negotiated two-state solution and preclude activities that harm such prospects, including the permanent reoccupation of the Gaza Strip, forced displacement of Palestinian civilians from Gaza, annexation of the West Bank, or continued settler violence in the West Bank;
(7)
to help defend Israel against credible threats of terrorism and military attacks, including by mobilizing missile defense systems; and
(8)
to ensure United States-origin defense articles are used in compliance with United States law.
Sec. 3. Rule of construction
Nothing in this Act may be construed to prevent the United States from—
(1)
defending against an attack on the United States or its personnel or facilities in other countries;
(2)
collecting, analyzing, or sharing intelligence, including with Israel and other countries as appropriate; or
(3)
assisting Israel and other countries—
(A)
in taking defensive measures to protect their territory from terrorist and other external threats;
(B)
in responding to contingencies that impact regional security or stability; or
(C)
by providing material for missile defense articles and systems, including Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow 3 maintenance and resupply.
Sec. 4. Prohibition on sale, export, or transfer of United States-origin defense articles to Israel and restriction on previously provided articles
(a) Report
(1) In general
Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress and make publicly available a report that certifies that during the reporting period—
(A)
the Government of Israel has not engaged in military operations in the Gaza Strip in violation of the ceasefire agreed to on October 10, 2025;
(B)
the Government of Israel has engaged constructively in negotiations to fully implement the 20-point plan outlined in the October 10 agreement;
(C)
the Government of Israel has ensured unimpeded humanitarian aid is being sent to and granted entry into the Gaza Strip, in quantities sufficient to meet civilian humanitarian needs and at a minimum consistent with those of the January 19, 2025, agreement, including by—
(i)
predictably allowing the range of necessary aid to enter, including diversified, nutrition-based foods; medicines; shelter; and a combination of commercial goods as well as humanitarian assistance;
(ii)
granting necessary registrations, visas, and other permissions to NGOs and entities able to provide aid without excessive burden;
(iii)
ensuring safe passage for aid workers through IDF controlled areas and continued deconfliction; and
(iv)
allowing rehabilitation of infrastructure, rehabilitation of hospitals and bakeries, and entry of necessary equipment to remove debris, perform demining operations, and open roads;
(D)
the Government of Israel has ensured that—
(i)
no civilians are forced to leave the Gaza Strip against their will;
(ii)
civilians who wish to leave the Gaza Strip are free to do so; and
(iii)
civilians who have left since October 7, 2023, or will leave the Gaza Strip are free to return;
(E)
the Government of Israel has ensured that there will be no permanent occupation or annexation of territory in the Gaza Strip;
(F)
the Government of Israel has halted all aerial and artillery bombardment and withdrawn all Israeli Defense Forces to the agreed-upon line, and that battle lines continue to remain frozen until conditions are met for the complete staged withdrawal, in accordance with the United States 20-point plan for Gaza announced on September 29, 2025;
(G)
the Government of Israel has taken verifiable steps to cooperate with Arab and other international partners to allow a temporary transitional government in the Gaza Strip consisting of a technocratic, Palestinian committee, responsible for delivering the day-to-day running of public services and municipalities for the people in Gaza and to ultimately ensure a pathway for a reformed Palestinian Authority to assume the governance of the Gaza Strip, in accordance with the United States 20-point plan for Gaza announced on September 29, 2025;
(H)
the Government of Israel has not served as an impediment to the establishment and deployment of a temporary International Stabilization Force that will train and provide support to Palestinian police forces in the Gaza Strip, which will become the long-term internal security solution in Gaza, in accordance with the United States 20-point plan for Gaza announced on September 29, 2025;
(I)
the Government of Israel has committed and continues to ensure that there will be no de facto or de jure annexation of territory in the West Bank; and
(J)
the Government of Israel has taken material steps to enforce the law in the West Bank and prevent attacks by settlers on Palestinians and has enforced procedures that prevent IDF troops from escorting and enabling settlers committing attacks.
(2) Definition
For purposes of paragraph (1)(G), the phrase has taken verifiable steps to cooperate with Arab and other international partners and allow a temporary transitional government in the Gaza Strip consisting of a technocratic Palestinian committee
means that the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, determines and certifies that the Government of Israel has—
(A)
taken affirmative steps within its control to facilitate the deployment and functioning of such committee, including through the issuance of necessary permits, provision of safe passage, and facilitation of the movement into and within the Gaza Strip of personnel, equipment, and financial resources necessary for the committee to perform its functions;
(B)
refrained from actions that materially obstruct, delay, or undermine the establishment or operation of such committee, including the arbitrary denial of access or the imposition of conditions inconsistent with the 20-point plan described in paragraph (1)(B); and
(C)
not directly or indirectly financed, facilitated, or enabled any person or organization, including through intermediaries, third-party pass-throughs, or other covert or informal channels, for the purpose of materially obstructing, delaying, undermining, or sabotaging the October 10, 2025, ceasefire, the 20-point plan, or the establishment or operation of the transitional governance and security arrangements described in paragraphs (1)(G) and (H).
(b) Determination as basis for certification
The certification in subsection (a) shall be based on an interagency assessment led by the Secretary of State and conducted in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense regarding Israel’s progress toward meeting the conditions described in subparagraphs (A) through (J) of subsection (a)(1). In preparing the certification, the Secretary of State shall consider all relevant information, including intelligence reporting and credible public reporting.
(c) Form
The reports required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.
(d) Prohibitions
(1) In general
If the certification in subsection (a) concludes that the Government of Israel is in violation of any of the conditions described in subparagraphs (A) through (J) of subsection (a)(1)—
(A)
the United States shall not authorize or permit the sale, export, or transfer of any United States-origin defense articles to Israel, provided through any source or existing authority, for end use in the West Bank or Gaza;
(B)
the sale, export, or transfer of any defense article to Israel shall only take place pursuant to a Letter of Offer and Acceptance or export license that requires that the Government of Israel will not use such articles in the West Bank or Gaza; and
(C)
the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, shall establish an agreement with the Government of Israel that any United States-origin defense articles sold, exported, or transferred to Israel prior to the date of the submission of the certification described in subsection (a) are prohibited from being used in the West Bank or Gaza.
(2) Sunset
The prohibitions in paragraph (1) shall remain in effect until a certification in subsection (a) concludes that Israel has come into compliance with all conditions described in subparagraphs (A) through (J) of subsection (a)(1).
(e) Appropriate committees of congress defined
In this section, the term appropriate committees of Congress means—
(1)
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and
(2)
the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
Sec. 5. End use monitoring group
(a) Establishment
Immediately after the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, shall take such steps as may be necessary to establish an end use monitoring group that shall serve to monitor whether United States-origin defense articles are being used in the West Bank or Gaza.
(b) Report
During such time as the prohibitions described in section 4(d) are in force, the end use monitoring group established by subsection (a) shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report every 60 days that certifies whether Israel is using United States-origin defense articles in the West Bank or Gaza.
(c) Prohibition
(1) In general
If the report in subsection (b) concludes that Israel is using United States-origin defense articles in the West Bank or Gaza, then the United States shall not authorize the sale, export, or transfer of any United States-origin defense articles to Israel.
(2) Waiver
(A) In general
The President may waive the prohibition in paragraph (1) for a specific sale, export, or transfer of defense articles to Israel only if the President—
(i)
determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that such waiver is vital to the national security of the United States; and
(ii)
not fewer than 15 days before authorizing such sale, export, or transfer, submits such certification, to—
(I)
the chair and ranking minority member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
(II)
the chair and ranking minority member of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
(B) Form
A certification under this paragraph shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex, and shall include—
(i)
a detailed description of the nature, quantity, and estimated value of the defense articles to be transferred;
(ii)
a description of the specific national security interests of the United States that would be directly and materially advanced by the waiver; and
(iii)
an explanation of why no feasible alternative to the waiver exists to achieve those interests.
(3) Rule of construction
Nothing in this subsection may be construed to limit the obligation or expenditure of any funds appropriated for air defense systems, including Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow 3 systems.
(4) Sunset
The prohibition in paragraph (1) shall remain in effect until a certification in subsection (b) concludes that Israel is not using United States-origin defense articles in the West Bank or Gaza.
(d) Appropriate committees of congress defined
In this section, the term appropriate committees of Congress means—
(1)
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and
(2)
the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
Sec. 6. Rules of construction relating to the Board of Peace
(a) Limitation on administrative and operating support
Nothing in this Act, the October 10, 2025, ceasefire agreement, the 20-point plan, or any related framework may be construed to authorize the obligation or expenditure of funds by, for, or on behalf of the Board of Peace for its administrative expenses, operating costs, or personnel support, or to authorize any Federal department or agency to obligate or expend funds for such administrative expenses, operating costs, or personnel support, except as expressly authorized by an Act of Congress and provided in advance in an appropriations Act.
(b) No displacement of the United Nations or other authorities
Nothing in this Act, the October 10, 2025, ceasefire agreement, the 20-point plan, or any related framework may be construed to grant the Board of Peace authority that supersedes the role or authorities of the United Nations under the Charter of the United Nations or otherwise supersedes any applicable provision of United States or international law.
(c) Preservation of assistance for Gaza
Nothing in this Act may be construed to limit the obligation or expenditure of funds for humanitarian assistance, stabilization, reconstruction, or other assistance for Gaza that is otherwise authorized by law and provided in an appropriations Act.
Sec. 7. Termination
The authorities provided by this Act shall cease to have effect on the date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.