June 3, 2026
Mr. Higgins of Louisiana introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committees on Intelligence (Permanent Select), and Financial Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned
To amend the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 to extend the authorities of title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, and for other purposes.
Section 1. Extension of authorities of title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
(a) Extension of repeal date of title VII
Section 403(b) of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (Public Law 110–261), as most recently amended by Public Law 119–87, is further amended—
(1)
in paragraph (1) (50 U.S.C. 1881 note) by striking June 12, 2026
and inserting June 12, 2029
; and
(2)
in paragraph (2) (18 U.S.C. 2511 note), in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking June 12, 2026
and inserting June 12, 2029
.
(b) Effective date
The amendments made by this section shall take effect on the earlier of the date of the enactment of this Act or June 11, 2026.
Sec. 2. Warrant requirement for acquisition of communications of United States persons
(a) Requirement
Paragraph (1) of subsection (n) of section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a) is amended to read as follows:
(1) Restriction
The Federal Bureau of Investigation may not ingest unminimized information acquired under this section into its analytic repositories unless—
(A)
the targeted person is relevant to an existing, open, predicated full national security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and
(B)
in the case of communications of a United States person acquired while targeting a person for an acquisition under subsection (a) who is not a United States person, if the target of the investigation is such United States person and the investigation is supported by probable cause that such United States person is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.
(b) Requirement
Section 702 of such Act is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
(o) Limitations on acquisition of communications of United States persons
(1) Prohibition
Pursuant to subsection (b), no officer or employee of the United States Government may intentionally target for acquisition the communications of a United States person pursuant to an authorization issued under subsection (a). Pursuant to other provisions of this Act and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Government may seek a warrant or other appropriate order supported by a probable cause showing to target for collection the communications of a United States person if there exists probable cause that the United States person to whom such communications relate—
(A)
is a foreign power or an agent of foreign power, in which circumstances the Government may seek authorization for electronic surveillance in accordance with title I, a physical search in accordance with title III, or for acquisitions in accordance with section 703, 704, or 705; or
(B)
is committing or has committed a crime, in which circumstances the Government may seek a warrant issued pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by a court of competent jurisdiction.
(2) Procedures and standards
The Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence shall jointly establish procedures and standards for officers and employees of the United States Government to determine the existence of probable cause described in paragraph (1).
(3) Periodic review
(A) Requirement
Not less frequently than once every 90 days, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court shall conduct a review of the implementation of this subsection.
(B) Scope of Review
Each review under subparagraph (A) shall include the following:
(i)
An assessment of whether the ingestion, retention, query, or other use of information acquired under subsection (a) concerning a United States person is in compliance with subsection (n)(1) and paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection.
(ii)
An evaluation of the adequacy of, and the application of, the minimization and querying procedures under this section.
(iii)
A review of the compliance of each element of the intelligence community with respect to making such queries.
(iv)
An identification of any incidents of noncompliance, including the scope, duration, and remedial actions taken.
(C) Report
On a quarterly basis, the Court shall submit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President of the Senate, the congressional intelligence committees, and the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Senate a summary, in a manner consistent with the protection of classified information, of the most recent review under subparagraph (A), including with respect to significant compliance issues.
(4) Savings provision
Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to limit the authority of the Government under any applicable laws or the Constitution of the United States.
(c) Use of information
Paragraph (2) of section 706(a) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1881e(a)) is amended to read as follows:
(2) United States persons
Any information concerning a United States person acquired under section 702 may not be used in evidence against that United States person pursuant to paragraph (1) in any criminal proceeding if such information was acquired in violation of subsection (o) of such section.
Sec. 3. Additional criminal penalties
Section 709 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881h) is amended to read as follows (and conform the table of contents at the beginning of such Act accordingly):
709. Penalties for unauthorized disclosure and other actions
(a) Offenses
(1) Unauthorized disclosure or retention
A person is guilty of an offense under this paragraph if that person knowingly and willfully—
(A)
communicates, furnishes, transmits, or otherwise makes available to an unauthorized person, or publishes, or uses in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States any classified information that contains the contents of any communication acquired under this title to which a known United States person is a party; or
(B)
retains with specific intent to violate, without authorization, including by approved procedures, any classified information that contains the contents of any communication acquired under this title to which a known United States person is a party.
(2) Unauthorized query
A person is guilty of an offense under this paragraph if that person, while serving as an officer or employee of a department or agency of the United States, with specific intent to violate this paragraph, willfully conducts a United States person query of information acquired under section 702(a), knowing that the query does not support a duly authorized purpose within the scope of the authority of such department or agency.
(3) Falsifies or misrepresents compliance
A person is guilty of an offense under this paragraph if that person knowingly and willfully, with specific intent to violate this paragraph, falsifies a record, or makes a material misrepresentation to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, regarding compliance with the procedures or requirements for querying information acquired under section 702(a).
(b) Penalties
(1) Unauthorized disclosure or retention
A person guilty of an offense in subsection (a)(1) shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, imprisoned for not more than 8 years, or both.
(2) Unauthorized query
A person guilty of an offense in subsection (a)(2) shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, imprisoned for not more than 2 years, or both.
(3) Falsifies or misrepresents compliance
A person guilty of an offense in subsection (a)(3) shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, imprisoned for not more than 2 years, or both.
(c) Defenses
(1) Unauthorized query
It is a defense to a prosecution under subsection (a)(2) that—
(A)
the defendant conducted the query in the course of the official duties of the person and such query was authorized by a supervisor, attorney, or member of the Senior Executive Service (or equivalent); or
(B)
such query was conducted pursuant to a duly authorized purpose.
(2) Misrepresents compliance
It is a defense to a prosecution under subsection (a)(3) that the defendant made the misrepresentation in the course of the official duties of the person and such misrepresentation was authorized by a supervisor, attorney, or member of the Senior Executive Service (or equivalent), or that the defendant made the misrepresentation acting based on a good faith understanding of the authorities, in compliance with approved procedures, and the facts known to the individual at the time.
(d) Jurisdiction
There is Federal jurisdiction over an offense under this section if the person committing the offense was an officer or employee of the United States at the time the offense was committed.
Sec. 4. Attendance procedures for Member access to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review
Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Attorney General shall—
(1)
revoke the procedures issued by the Attorney General on or before December 31, 2025, pursuant to section 5(d) of the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act (Public Law 118–49; 50 U.S.C. 1803 note); and
(2)
issue new procedures that comply with such section and ensure the access of the Members of Congress and staff specified in such section to any proceeding of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or any proceeding of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review.
Sec. 5. Requirement for attorney approval of FBI queries using United States person query term
Section 702(f)(3)(A)(i) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a(f)(3)(A)(i)) is amended by striking supervisor (or employee of equivalent or greater rank) or
.
Sec. 6. Government Accountability Office audit of targeting procedures under section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
(a) Audit
The Comptroller General of the United States, consistent with the protection of sensitive sources and methods, shall conduct an audit of the targeting procedures used for acquisitions under section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a), including the technical mechanisms, implementation, and operations used by the Federal Government for targeting capabilities.
(b) Report
Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report containing the results of the audit required by subsection (a), including an analysis of whether the targeting procedures as implemented are appropriately limiting targeting under section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a) to non-United States persons located outside of the United States.
Sec. 7. Central bank digital currency
The Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 221 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 16 (12 U.S.C. 411 et seq.) the following:
16A. Central bank digital currency
(a) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Central bank digital currency
The term central bank digital currency means a digital asset that—
(A)
is denominated in United States dollars;
(B)
is a United States currency;
(C)
is a direct liability of the Federal Reserve System; and
(D)
is widely available to the general public.
(2) Digital asset
The term digital asset has the meaning given the term in section 2 of the GENIUS Act (12 U.S.C. 5901).
(b) Prohibition
Except as provided in subsection (c), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or a Federal reserve bank may not issue or create a central bank digital currency or any digital asset that is substantially similar to a central bank digital currency directly or indirectly through a financial institution or other intermediary.
(c) Exception
Subsection (b) shall not prohibit any dollar-denominated currency that is open, permissionless, and private, and fully preserves the privacy protections of United States coins and physical currency.
(d) Sunset
This provisions of this section shall cease to be effective on December 31, 2031.
(e) Rule of construction
Nothing in this section shall be construed to allow the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve to issue a central bank digital currency or any digital asset that is substantially similar to a central bank digital currency directly or indirectly absent authorization by an Act of Congress.