(1)

The collapse of Iraqi security forces in Mosul and elsewhere in 2014 enabled the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) to capture and exploit significant quantities of United States-origin and United States-provided equipment.

(2)

The collapse of Afghan security forces in 2021 resulted in the acquisition by the Taliban and other hostile actors of substantial United States-funded defense equipment.

(3)

The United States Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction found that the Taliban likely gained access to approximately $57,600,000 in funds provided by the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the United States Agency for International Development to the former Afghan government.

(4)

The Department of Defense reported that it left at least $7,100,000,000 in United States-funded defense equipment in Afghanistan upon the United States departure in 2021.

(5)

According to news reporting from June through August 2021, the Taliban captured significant quantities of United States-provided vehicles and equipment from Afghan security forces prior to the collapse of the former Afghan government, including, in at least one reported period, approximately 700 trucks and Humvees, and reporting citing a United States official and an intelligence assessment indicated the Taliban was believed to control more than 2,000 armored vehicles and dozens of fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, following the collapse.

(6)

Department of Defense oversight reporting found that interagency information regarding funds and equipment left behind in Afghanistan was limited, and that the agencies lacked plans to recover such funds or equipment.

(7)

Credible news reporting in May 2015, citing statements by Iraqi government officials, indicated that ISIL captured approximately 2,300 Humvee armored vehicles from Iraqi security forces in Mosul in 2014. Credible reporting further indicated that ISIL converted captured United States-provided Humvee vehicles into vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, including suicide car bombs, and employed such devices against Iraqi and Kurdish partner forces.

(8)

Iranian-backed militia and proxy networks operating in Iraq and Syria have demonstrated the capability and intent to infiltrate, influence, or exploit partner security institutions and logistics nodes, increasing the risk that United States-origin defense equipment may be diverted, transferred, or otherwise accessed by state-backed proxy forces.

(9)

Any decisions regarding force reposturing or withdrawal should be predicated on comprehensive equipment accountability, cost transparency, and partner force resiliency assessments to mitigate the risk of diversion.

(10)

Disposition decisions should leverage a full spectrum of options—including retrograde, destruction, and sale to identify cost-neutral or cost-offsetting solutions for surplus equipment.

(11)

Current Department of Defense property accountability and security assistance monitoring frameworks lack the systemic integration necessary to provide Congress with timely, comprehensive accounting or cost-benefit analyses regarding equipment disposition during force withdrawals or significant reposturing.

(a) Oversight of disposition

Chapter 153 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 2581 the following new section:

2582. Disposition of accountable property in designated theaters of operation

(a) Reporting requirement

Not later than 60 days after initiating any significant force reposturing or withdrawal within or from a covered theater of operations, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report that includes, with respect to accountable property used in connection with the operations associated with such reposturing or withdrawal, the following elements:

(1)

A comprehensive inventory of such property (including, to the extent practicable, the serial number and end-item identity of any such property that is a controlled inventory item), including an identification of—

(A)

whether such property remains under the custody and control of the United States;

(B)

to the extent known and consistent with available records, whether such property was previously sold or otherwise transferred to an ally or partner of the United States;

(C)

whether the Secretary has proposed a disposition for such property and if so, which disposition; and

(D)

to the extent known or assessed, the status of such property, including, if known, the disposition of such property and the end user of such property.

(2)

For each category of major defense equipment, an assessment of the feasibility, timeline, operational effect, and security, accountability, and end-user monitoring considerations, associated with potential dispositions for accountable property within each such category.

(3)

For any covered disposition assessed under paragraph (2), a description of any operational or logistical constraint rendering other dispositions unfeasible or impracticable.

(4)

For each potential disposition for accountable property assessed as feasible pursuant to paragraph (2), an estimate of the incremental costs of such option relative to baseline costs of withdrawal and redeployment activities, including an identification of—

(A)

costs associated with the shipping and handling of such property; and

(B)

costs associated with the sustainment and storage for such property.

(5)

A plan to mitigate the risk of diversion or misuse resulting from dispositions of accountable property that includes the following:

(A)

An identification of relevant end-use monitoring requirements of the Department of Defense, including the office of the Department responsible for implementing such requirements, the frequency of monitoring under such requirements, and any procedures for addressing noncompliance with such requirements, including in the event of the loss of the property.

(B)

An identification of any feasible remote disablement capability that may be used with respect to such property, and, for any such capability the use of which is not feasible, an explanation of any technical, operational, or legal constraints to such use.

(C)

Procedures for the implementation of the plan with respect to accountable property that is sensitive technology (including communications security items, cryptographic material, biometrics collection devices, and associated databases) prior to determining a disposition for such technology.

(D)

A plan to secure, retrieve, disable, or otherwise neutralize accountable property in the event of the ally or partner of the United States to which such property was sold or transferred experiencing a collapse or regime change.

(E)

A chain-of-custody plan for the transport, storage, and transfer of accountable property, including an identification of responsible units, storage site controls, and inspection checkpoints.

(6)

For any accountable property previously sold or otherwise transferred to an ally or partner of the United States, or proposed to be so sold or transferred, an assessment of the following:

(A)

The capacity of the end user, or prospective end user, to sustain such property absent support by the United States Armed Forces or contractors of the Department of Defense.

(B)

To the extent practicable, whether the end user, or prospective end user—

(i)

has been subject to any security vetting or monitoring by the Secretary, including an identification of any period of continuous monitoring;

(ii)

maintains effective command-and-control structures; or

(iii)

is subject to infiltration, coercion, or substantial influence by any foreign terrorist organization or other hostile actor.

(C)

The effect, or anticipated effect, of the sale or transfer on morale and retention with respect to the United States Armed Forces.

(D)

Whether there is a history of accountable property previously sold or transferred to the ally or partner being diverted to an unauthorized end user, including, as applicable, an identification of any such prior diversion, the assessed end user, and the quantity and type of any major defense equipment so diverted.

(E)

The risk of the ally or partner experiencing rapid collapse.

(7)

An assessment of the significant force reposturing or withdrawal with respect to applicable lessons learned from the operations of United States Armed Forces in Iraq in 2014, and the withdrawal of such forces from Afghanistan in 2021, including an assessment of—

(A)

specific decision points with respect to such operations in which diversion risk was underestimated; and

(B)

any mitigation measures that would have reduced such risk.

(b) Notification of certain sales and transfers

Not later than 30 days after the date of a sale or transfer of accountable property in connection with a significant force reposturing or withdrawal within or from a covered theater of operations, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a notification the contains, to the extent known—

(1)

a description of the accountable property sold or otherwise transferred;

(2)

a description of the end user of such property; and

(3)

a certification of the conduct of the assessment required under paragraph (1)(A).

(c) Senior approval requirement

(1)

The Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense shall approve, in writing, any determination to proceed with a disposition described in paragraph (2) for accountable property with an aggregate replacement value exceeding $10,000,000.

(2)

A disposition described in this paragraph is, with respect to accountable property, the abandonment or loss of such property without continuous custody and control by the United States or a partner or ally of the United States, the destruction of such property, or the demilitarization of such property.

(d) Annual report and notification requirements

(1)

Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this section, and annually thereafter for five years, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report containing, with respect to the year preceding the date of submission of the report, the following:

(A)

A summary of the dispositions of accountable property in covered theaters of operation, including any covered dispositions.

(B)

A summary of any incidents in which major defense equipment was diverted, including an identification of the quantity and type of equipment so diverted and, to the extent practicable, the assessed end user.

(C)

A summary of risk mitigation measures implemented, consistent with the plan under subsection (a)(5).

(D)

Any material changes in the resilience of allies or partners of the United States relevant to determinations regarding dispositions for accountable property, including with respect to the risk of infiltration or diversion.

(2)

Not later than 30 days after any date on which the Secretary of Defense becomes aware of a collapse of an ally or partner force or other event that the Secretary determines materially increases the risk of accountable property being diverted in a covered theater of operations, the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees written notification that includes a description of the event, the categories of property at risk of diversion, and any mitigation measure implemented.

(3)

(A)

Not later than 30 days after any date on which the Secretary of Defense becomes aware that accountable property subject to a covered disposition in a covered theater of operations has been diverted and used in an attack conducted by a foreign terrorist organization or other hostile actor against the United States, allies or partners of the United States, or local populations, the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees a written notification.

(B)

Each notification under subparagraph (A) shall include, to the extent practicable—

(i)

an identification of the accountable property used in the attack;

(ii)

an identification of the date on which, and the location from which, the property left the custody and control of the United States or an ally or partner of the United States;

(iii)

an attribution as to the actor responsible for the attack; and

(iv)

the total number of casualties caused by the attack.

(e) Form of reports

Each report required under this section shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

(f) Definitions

In this section:

(1)

The term accountable property means any accountable property of the Department of Defense, as described in Department of Defense Instruction 5000.64, titled Accountability and Management of DoD Equipment and Other Accountable Property and dated June 10, 2019 (or any such successor instruction).

(2)

The term aggregate replacement value, with respect to accountable property, means the total replacement value of such property as reflected in property accountability systems of the Department of Defense, or, if not recorded therein, the best available estimate for such value as determined by the Secretary.

(3)

The term controlled inventory item means any item designated as such pursuant to Department of Defense Instruction 5000.64, titled Accountability and Management of DoD Equipment and Other Accountable Property and dated June 10, 2019 (or any such successor instruction).

(4)

The term covered disposition, with respect to accountable property—

(A)

means disposition of such property other than a retrograde, destruction, demilitarization, sale, or other transfer, carried out in accordance with applicable provisions of law; and

(B)

includes the abandonment of such property without continuous custody and control by the United States or a partner or ally of the United States.

(5)

The term covered theater of operations means any geographic area designated by the Secretary of Defense for purposes of this section in which the United States Armed Forces are conducting contingency operations, advising or assisting ally or partner forces engaged in hostilities, or conducting operations in an environment with respect to which the Secretary determines there is a material risk of the loss or abandonment of such property without continuous custody and control by the United States or a partner or ally of the United States as a result of armed conflict, terrorist activity, collapse of an ally or partner force, or seizure by a hostile actor, taking into account any history of diversion of such property to an unauthorized end user.

(6)

The term disposition, with respect to accountable property, includes the retrograde, destruction, demilitarization, sale, transfer, loss, and abandonment of such property.

(7)

The term foreign terrorist organization means an organization so designated by the Secretary of State under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189).

(8)

The term major defense equipment has the meaning given such term in section 47 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2794).

(9)

The term significant force reposturing or withdrawal means a reduction, redeployment, or consolidation of the United States Armed Forces that the Secretary of Defense determines is significant for purposes of this section, including any action that—

(A)

closes, transfers, or materially reduces the capacity of a facility of the Department of Defense;

(B)

results in the disposition of accountable property with an aggregate value exceeding $10,000,000; or

(C)

reduces United States Armed Forces personnel levels by more than 20 percent in a given covered theater of operations over a 90-day period.

(b) Initial baseline report

(c) Report on senior leader accountability for certain dispositions

(d) GAO review

(e) Definitions

In this section: