March 26, 2026
Mr. Merkley (for himself, Mr. Cruz, Mr. Curtis, Mr. Kim, and Mr. Coons) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
July 27, 2026
Reported by Mr. Risch, with an amendment
Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic
To promote the development, production, and deployment of secure and resilient Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) to enhance United States national security and support the defense and resilience of Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region.
Section 1. Short title
This Act may be cited as the Blue Skies for Taiwan Act of 2026
.
Sec. 2. Definitions
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees
The term appropriate congressional committees means—
(A)
the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on the Budget, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(B)
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on the Budget, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2) Blue UAS
The term Blue UAS refers to UAS components and systems that comply with Defense Contract Management Agency’s Blue UAS program and its associated list.
Sec. 3. Findings
Congress makes the following findings:
(1)
Taiwan is a longstanding and vital democratic partner whose security is central to United States strategic interests and regional stability in the Indo-Pacific region.
(2)
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is increasingly employing gray-zone tactics, including routine use of unmanned aerial systems and other low-cost platforms, to pressure Taiwan and undermine its security.
(3)
As set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Public Law 96–8), it is United States policy to maintain its capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion against Taiwan and provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive nature.
(4)
As set forth in the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act (subtitle A of title XII of Public Law 117–263), it is the sense of Congress that the United States should support Taiwan’s acquisition and employment of capabilities that advance asymmetric strategies.
(5)
The vast majority of commercially available UAS contain PRC-sourced components, creating significant cybersecurity, supply chain, and operational risks for both Taiwan and the United States.
(6)
Taiwan is well-positioned to develop and produce UAS components and systems but faces challenges in competing with PRC commercial companies, accessing capital, and meeting United States certification and cybersecurity requirements.
(7)
The United States should support UAS supply chain development in Taiwan to strengthen Taiwan’s asymmetric defense posture and expand United States access to secure, PRC-independent UAS components and systems.
(8)
The Army Organic Industrial Base, including its arsenals, depots, and ammunition plants, is undergoing modernization to support emerging technologies and may provide opportunities to support the testing and sustainment of unmanned aerial systems and related components in coordination with allies and partners.
Sec. 4. Blue UAS Working Group
(a) Establishment
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall establish a Blue UAS working group, leveraging existing workstreams and expanding scope as needed, inclusive of government, industry, and academic experts, to—
(1)
assess Taiwan’s domestic drone production capacity, including research and development, legal and regulatory frameworks, testing, certification, and production capacities for dual-use drones;
(2)
evaluate opportunities for public-private partnerships between the United States and Taiwan for co-development and co-production of UAS systems and components, including pilot programs;
(3)
identify barriers to the inclusion of Taiwan-manufactured components and systems manufactured in Blue UAS programs;
(4)
identify regulatory, export-control, and certification barriers that impede Taiwan’s participation in Blue UAS programs;
(5)
provide recommendations to expand and improve incorporation of Taiwanese suppliers into Blue UAS programs;
(6)
identify specific UAS components or systems that could be integrated into Blue UAS programs within 12 to 24 months;
(7)
analyze opportunities and impediments to including Taiwan in Replicator programs and similar initiatives; and
(8)
assess opportunities for collaboration with the Army Organic Industrial Base, including its arsenals, depots, and ammunition plants, to support the testing, evaluation, production, maintenance, and sustainment of Blue UAS components and systems, including those co-developed or co-produced with Taiwan.
(b) Reporting
Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for three years, the Working Group shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an unclassified report on its activities, including findings, recommendations, timelines, resource needs, and potential funding mechanisms, with a classified appendix as necessary.
Sec. 5. Cooperative framework with allies
(a) In general
The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall establish a cooperative framework, drawing on the Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience (PIPIR), among the United States, Taiwan, and regional allies and global partners to promote secure, PRC-independent UAS supply chains and enhance interoperability.
(b) Elements
The cooperative framework shall include—
(1)
support regional allies in the acquisition of Blue UAS components or systems from Taiwan in lieu of PRC-sourced components; and
(2)
fast-track Blue UAS certification for components co-developed or co-produced by Taiwan and regional allies.
Sec. 6. Fast-track certification
(a) In general
The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall develop a fast-track process for Blue UAS companies in Taiwan to obtain Blue UAS certification.
(b) Elements
The fast-track certification process shall include the following procedures:
(1)
Expedited export control reviews and licensing for Taiwan drone and drone component manufacturers, including streamlined technical reviews for components with no PRC-connected subcomponents.
(2)
A fast-track certification procedure for Taiwanese manufacturers, including reciprocal testing arrangements or recognition of equivalent Taiwan cybersecurity standards where appropriate.
Sec. 7. Authorization of appropriations
There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act.
Sec. 8. Rules of construction
Nothing in this Act shall be construed—
(1)
to alter United States policy towards Taiwan as codified in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Public Law 96–8); and
(2)
to alter the United States Government’s position with respect to the international status of Taiwan.
Section 1. Short title
This Act may be cited as the Blue Skies for Taiwan Act of 2026
.
Sec. 2. Definitions
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees
The term appropriate congressional committees means—
(A)
the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on the Budget, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(B)
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on the Budget, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2) Blue UAS
The term Blue UAS refers to UAS components and systems that comply with Defense Contract Management Agency’s Blue UAS program and its associated list.
Sec. 3. Findings
Congress makes the following findings:
(1)
Taiwan is a longstanding and vital democratic partner whose security is central to United States strategic interests and regional stability in the Indo-Pacific region.
(2)
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is increasingly employing gray-zone tactics, including routine use of unmanned aerial systems and other low-cost platforms, to pressure Taiwan and undermine its security.
(3)
As set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Public Law 96–8), it is United States policy to maintain its capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion against Taiwan and provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive nature.
(4)
As set forth in the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act (subtitle A of title XII of Public Law 117–263), it is the sense of Congress that the United States should support Taiwan’s acquisition and employment of capabilities that advance asymmetric strategies.
(5)
The vast majority of commercially available UAS contain PRC-sourced components, creating significant cybersecurity, supply chain, and operational risks for both Taiwan and the United States.
(6)
Taiwan is well-positioned to develop and produce UAS components and systems but faces challenges in competing with PRC commercial companies, accessing capital, and meeting United States certification and cybersecurity requirements.
(7)
The United States should support UAS supply chain development in Taiwan to strengthen Taiwan’s asymmetric defense posture and expand United States access to secure, PRC-independent UAS components and systems.
(8)
The Army Organic Industrial Base, including its arsenals, depots, and ammunition plants, is undergoing modernization to support emerging technologies and may provide opportunities to support the testing and sustainment of unmanned aerial systems and related components in coordination with allies and partners.
Sec. 4. Blue UAS Working Group
(a) Establishment
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall establish a Blue UAS working group, leveraging existing workstreams and expanding scope as needed, inclusive of government, industry, and academic experts, to—
(1)
assess Taiwan’s domestic drone production capacity, including research and development, legal and regulatory frameworks, testing, certification, and production capacities for dual-use drones;
(2)
evaluate opportunities for public-private partnerships between the United States and Taiwan for co-development and co-production of UAS systems and components, including pilot programs;
(3)
identify barriers to the inclusion of Taiwan-manufactured components and systems manufactured in Blue UAS programs;
(4)
identify regulatory, export-control, and certification barriers that impede Taiwan’s participation in Blue UAS programs;
(5)
provide recommendations to expand and improve incorporation of Taiwanese suppliers into Blue UAS programs;
(6)
identify specific UAS components or systems that could be integrated into Blue UAS programs within 12 to 24 months;
(7)
analyze opportunities and impediments to include Taiwan in the Defense Autonomous Warfare Group and similar initiatives;
(8)
assess opportunities for collaboration with the Army Organic Industrial Base, including its arsenals, depots, and ammunition plants, to support the testing, evaluation, production, maintenance, and sustainment of Blue UAS components and systems, including those co-developed or co-produced with Taiwan; and
(9)
institute lessons learned from the war in Ukraine, in consultation with the United States European Command (EUCOM) and Ukrainian officials.
(b) Reporting
Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for three years, the Working Group shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an unclassified report on its activities, including findings, recommendations, timelines, resource needs, and potential funding mechanisms, with a classified appendix as necessary.
Sec. 5. Cooperative framework with allies
(a) In general
The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall establish a cooperative framework, drawing on the Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience (PIPIR), among the United States, Taiwan, and regional allies and global partners to promote secure, PRC-independent UAS supply chains and enhance interoperability.
(b) Elements
The cooperative framework shall include—
(1)
support regional allies in the acquisition of Blue UAS components or systems from Taiwan in lieu of PRC-sourced components; and
(2)
fast-track Blue UAS certification for components co-developed or co-produced by Taiwan and regional allies.
Sec. 6. Fast-track certification
(a) In general
The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall develop a fast-track process for Blue UAS companies in Taiwan to obtain Blue UAS certification.
(b) Elements
The fast-track certification process shall include the following procedures:
(1)
Expedited export control reviews and licensing for Taiwan drone and drone component manufacturers, including streamlined technical reviews for components with no PRC-connected subcomponents.
(2)
A fast-track certification procedure for Taiwanese manufacturers, including reciprocal testing arrangements or recognition of equivalent Taiwan cybersecurity standards where appropriate.
Sec. 7. Rules of construction
Nothing in this Act shall be construed—
(1)
to alter United States policy towards Taiwan as codified in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Public Law 96–8);
(2)
to alter the United States commitment to the One China Policy, including commitments made in the Three United States-China Communiqués and the Six Assurances to Taiwan; or
(3)
to alter the United States Government’s position with respect to the international status of Taiwan.