(1) Availability

The classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the President.

(2) Distribution by the President

Subject to paragraph (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule, within the executive branch of the Federal Government.

(3) Limits on disclosure

The President shall not publicly disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any portion of such Schedule except—

(1) In general

Subsection (a) of section 103A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3026) is amended—

(2) Conforming amendments

Subsection (c) of such section is amended—

(3) Additional conforming amendment

(1) In general

Section 103A(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3026(b)) is amended—

(2) Conforming amendments

The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended—

(1) Section heading

Section 103A of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3026) is further amended, in the section heading, by striking Deputy Directors of National Intelligence and inserting Deputy Director of National Intelligence and Assistant Directors of National Intelligence.

(2) Table of contents

The table of contents for such Act, in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act, is amended by striking the item relating to section 103A and inserting the following:

(1) Repeal

Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by striking section 103K (50 U.S.C. 3034b).

(2) Conforming amendment

Section 103G of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3032) is amended by striking subsection (d).

(3) Clerical amendment

The table of contents for such Act in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act is amended by striking the item relating to section 103K.

(1) Termination

The Director of National Intelligence shall take such actions as may be necessary to terminate and wind down the operations of the Intelligence Community Innovation Unit before the date specified in paragraph (3).

(2) Repeal

(3) Effective date

The amendments made by this subsection shall take effect on the date that is 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(1) Repeal

Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is further amended by striking section 120 (50 U.S.C. 3060).

(2) Conforming amendment

Section 331 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117–81; 10 U.S.C. 113 note) is amended by striking paragraph (2) and inserting the following:

(2)

The term climate security means the effects of climate change on the following:

(A)

The national security of the United States, including national security infrastructure.

(B)

Subnational, national, and regional political stability.

(C)

The security of allies and partners of the United States.

(D)

Ongoing or potential political violence, including unrest, rioting, guerrilla warfare, insurgency, terrorism, rebellion, revolution, civil war, and interstate war.

(3) Clerical amendment

The table of contents for such Act, in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act, is further amended by striking the item relating to section 120.

(1) Repeal

Subtitle A of title X of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3191 et seq.) is amended by striking section 1002 (50 U.S.C. 3192).

(2) Clerical amendment

The table of contents for such Act, in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act, is further amended by striking the item relating to section 1002.

(1) Termination

The Director of National Intelligence shall take such actions as may be necessary to terminate and wind down the operations of the Foreign Languages Program before the date specified in paragraph (5).

(2) Repeals

Subtitle B of such title (50 U.S.C. 3201 et seq.) is amended by striking sections 1011 (50 U.S.C. 3201, relating to program on advancement of foreign languages critical to the intelligence community), 1012 (50 U.S.C. 3202, relating to education partnerships), and 1013 (50 U.S.C. 3203, relating to voluntary services).

(3) Conforming amendments

Such subtitle is further amended by striking sections 1014 (50 U.S.C. 3204, relating to regulations) and 1015 (50 U.S.C. 3205, relating to definitions).

(4) Clerical amendments

The table of contents for such Act, in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act, is further amended by striking the items relating to subtitle B of title X.

(5) Effective date

The amendments made by this subsection shall take effect on the date that is 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(1) Termination

The Joint Intelligence Community Council is terminated.

(2) Conforming amendment

Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by striking section 101A (50 U.S.C. 3022).

(3) Repeal of requirement to consult with joint intelligence community council for national intelligence program budget

Section 102A(c)(1)(B) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(c)(1)(B)) is amended by striking , as appropriate, after obtaining the advice of the Joint Intelligence Community Council,.

(4) Clerical amendment

The table of contents for such Act in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act is amended by striking the item relating to section 101A.

(1) Title 10

Section 2151(b) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking paragraph (3).

(2) Title 17

Section 105(d)(2) of title 17, United States Code, is amended—

(3) Damon paul nelson and matthew young pollard intelligence authorization act for fiscal years 2018, 2019, and 2020

The Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (division E of Public Law 116–92) is amended by striking section 5324 (50 U.S.C. 3334a).

(A)

in paragraph (2), by striking ; and and inserting a semicolon;

(B)

by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); and

(C)

by inserting after paragraph (2), the following new paragraph (3):

(3)

identify and mitigate counterintelligence threats to the Department of the Treasury; and; and

(A)

in paragraph (1), by striking in support and all that follows through of the homeland. and inserting pertaining to foreign threats to the homeland, as determined by the Secretary.;

(B)

in paragraph (2)—

(C)

in paragraph (3)(A), by striking terrorist and other and inserting foreign;

(D)

in paragraph (6), by striking terrorist attacks against and inserting foreign threats to;

(E)

by striking paragraphs (7), (17), and (23), and redesignating paragraphs (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (18), (19), (20), (21), and (22) as paragraphs (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), (19), and (20), respectively;

(F)

in paragraph (7), as so redesignated, by striking threats of terrorism and inserting foreign threats;

(G)

in paragraph (9), as so redesignated, by striking threats of terrorism in and inserting foreign threats to; and

(H)

in paragraph (12), as so redesignated, by striking , other agencies and all that follows through by the Department,; and

(1) In general

Section 215(c) of the Department of Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7144b(c)) is amended to read as follows:

(c) Director

(1) Appointment

The head of the Office shall be the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Director of the Office shall report directly to the Secretary.

(2) Term

(A) In general

The Director shall serve for a term of 6 years.

(B) Reappointment

The Director shall be eligible for reappointment for 1 or more terms.

(3) Qualifications

The Director shall—

(A)

be an employee in the Senior Executive Service, the Senior Intelligence Service, the Senior National Intelligence Service, or any other Service that the Secretary, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, considers appropriate; and

(B)

have substantial expertise in matters relating to the intelligence community, including foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.

(2) Effective date

The amendment made by this section shall take effect on January 21, 2029.

(1) In general

Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

519. Procedures regarding dissemination of nonpublicly available information concerning United States persons

(a) Procedures

The head of each element of the intelligence community, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall develop and maintain procedures for that element to respond to unmasking requests.

(b) Requirements

The procedures required by subsection (a) shall ensure, at a minimum, the following:

(1)

Each unmasking request submitted to a disseminating element shall include, in writing—

(A)

information that identifies the disseminated intelligence report containing the United States person identifying information requested;

(B)

the date the unmasking request was submitted to the disseminating element;

(C)

the name, title, and organization of the individual who submitted the unmasking request in an official capacity;

(D)

the name, title, and organization of each individual who will receive the United States person identifying information sought by the unmasking request; and

(E)

a fact-based justification describing why such United States person identifying information is required by each individual who will receive the information to carry out the duties of the individual.

(2)

An unmasking request may only be approved by the head of the disseminating element or by officers or employees of such element to whom the head has specifically delegated such authority. When the disseminating element is not the originating element of the United States person identifying information, the head of the disseminating element shall obtain the concurrence of the head or designee of the originating element before approving the unmasking request.

(3)

The head of the disseminating element shall retain records on all unmasking requests, including the disposition of such requests, for not less than 10 years.

(4)

The records described in paragraph (3) shall include, with respect to each approved unmasking request—

(A)

the name and title of the individual of the disseminating element who approved the request; and

(B)

the fact-based justification for the request.

(5)

The procedures shall include an exception that—

(A)

allows for the immediate disclosure of United States person identifying information in the event of exigent circumstances or when a delay would likely result in the significant loss of intelligence; and

(B)

requires that promptly after such disclosure, the recipient of the United States person identifying information make a written unmasking request with respect to such information.

(6)

If an unmasking request is made during a period beginning on the date of a general election for President and ending on the date on which such President is inaugurated—

(A)

the documentation required by paragraph (1) shall include whether—

(i)

the requesting entity knows or reasonably believes that any United States person identifying information sought is of an individual who is a member of the transition team as identified by an apparent successful candidate for the office of President or Vice President; or

(ii)

based on the intelligence report to which the unmasking request pertains, the disseminating element or the originating element knows or reasonably believes that any United States person identifying information sought is of an individual who is a member of the transition team as identified by an apparent successful candidate for the office of President or Vice President;

(B)

the approval made pursuant to paragraph (2) of an unmasking request that contains United States person identifying information described in subparagraph (A) shall be subject to the concurrence of the general counsel of the disseminating element (or, in the absence of the general counsel, the principal deputy general counsel, or, as applicable, the senior Departmental legal officer supporting the disseminating element) that the dissemination of such United States person identifying information is in accordance with the procedures required by subsection (a); and

(C)

consistent with due regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters, the head of the disseminating element shall notify the chairmen and ranking minority members of the congressional intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House of Representatives, and the majority leader and minority leader of the Senate of an approval described in subparagraph (B) not later than 14 days after the date of such approval.

(7)

If an unmasking request concerns a nominee for or the holder of a Federal office, a member of a transition team as identified by an eligible candidate for the office of the President, a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, or an individual nominated by the President to be a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, and such unmasking request is approved, the head of the disseminating element shall submit the documentation for the request to the congressional intelligence committees not later than 14 days after the date of such approval.

(c) Annual reports

Not later than March 1 of each year, the head of each element of the intelligence community shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report documenting, with respect to the year covered by the report—

(1)

the total number of unmasking requests received by that element;

(2)

of such total number, the number of requests approved;

(3)

of such total number, the number of requests denied; and

(4)

for each number calculated under paragraphs (1) through (3), the number disaggregated by requesting entity.

(d) Certain procedures regarding congressional identity information

With respect to the dissemination of congressional identity information, the head of each element of the intelligence community shall carry out this section in accordance with annex A of Intelligence Community Directive 112, or successor annex or directive.

(e) Effect on minimization procedures

The requirements of this section are in addition to—

(1)

any minimization procedures established under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.);

(2)

any procedures governing the collection, retention, or dissemination of information concerning United States persons established under Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 note; relating to United States intelligence activities) or successor order; and

(3)

any other provision of statute or Executive order the Director of National Intelligence considers relevant.

(f) Definitions

In this section:

(1) Apparent successful candidate

The term apparent successful candidate means any apparent successful candidate for the office of President or Vice President as determined pursuant to the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 (3 U.S.C. 102 note).

(2) Candidate; Federal office

The terms candidate and Federal office have the meanings given those terms in section 301 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30101).

(3) Congressional identity information

The term congressional identity information means information that identifies, by name or by individually identifying titles or characteristics—

(A)

any current Member of the Senate or the House of Representatives;

(B)

any current staff officer for any Senator or Representative, whether paid or unpaid; or

(C)

any current staff officer of any committee of the Senate or the House of Representatives, whether paid or unpaid.

(4) Disseminating element

The term disseminating element means an element of the intelligence community that disseminated an intelligence report subject to an unmasking request.

(5) Eligible candidate

The term eligible candidate has the meaning given that term in section 3(h)(4) of the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 (3 U.S.C. 102 note).

(6) Originating element

The term originating element means an element of the intelligence community that originated information in a disseminated intelligence report subject to an unmasking request.

(7) Requesting entity

The term requesting entity means an entity of—

(A)

the United State Government; or

(B)

a State, local, Tribal, or territorial government.

(8) United States person

The term United States person means a United States person as defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801) or section 3.5 of Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 note; relating to United States intelligence activities).

(9) United States person identifying information

(A) In general

The term United States person identifying information (commonly referred to as United States Person Information)—

(i)

means information that is reasonably likely to identify one or more specific United States persons; and

(ii)

includes a single item of information and information that, when combined with other information, is reasonably likely to identify one or more specific United States persons.

(B) Determination

The determination of whether information is reasonably likely to identify one or more specific United States persons may require assessment by a trained intelligence professional on a case-by-case basis.

(10) Unmasking request

The term unmasking request means a request to gain access to nonpublic United States person identifying information concerning a known unconsenting United States person that was omitted from a disseminated intelligence report by the originating element.

(2) Clerical amendment

The table of contents preceding section 2 of such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 518 the following new item:

(1) Department

The term Department means the Department of Commerce.

(2) Secretary

The term Secretary means the Secretary of Commerce.

(1) Agreement with Secretary of Commerce

The Director of National Intelligence, acting through the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, shall seek to enter into an agreement with the Secretary under which the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary shall establish within the Department, within the Office of Secretary, an office, which shall be known as the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office, in accordance with this section.

(2) Location

The Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office established pursuant to this section shall be physically located within the headquarters of the Department and within reasonable proximity to the offices of the leadership of the Department.

(3) Security

The Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center shall be responsible for the protection of classified information and for the establishment and enforcement of all security-related controls within the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office.

(1) Director

(2) Deputy Director

There shall be within the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office a Deputy Director who is appointed by the Secretary, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence. The Deputy Director shall—

(3) Other employees

(1)

the renovation, furnishing, and equipping of a Federal building, as necessary, to meet the security and operational requirements of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office;

(2)

the provision of connectivity to the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office to enable briefings, secure audio and video communications, and collaboration between employees of the Department and the intelligence community at the unclassified, secret, and top secret levels;

(3)

the provision of other information technology systems and devices, such as computers, printers, and phones, for use by employees of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office;

(4)

the assignment of employees of the intelligence community to support the operation of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office; and

(5)

the provision of other personal services necessary for the operation of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office.

(1) Establishment

Not later than January 1, 2028, the Director of National Intelligence shall seek to establish, in accordance with this section, the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office within the Department.

(2) Report

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report on the plan to establish the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office required under paragraph (1). Such report shall include the costs and schedule associated with establishing the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office.

(1)

In 2025, foreign malicious cybercriminal organizations, such as foreign scam centers that engage in sophisticated investment fraud, cyber-enabled extortion activity, and impersonation-based fraud, stole at least $7,566,000,000 from Americans according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Internet Crime Complaint Center, which has emphasized that these estimates are conservative and only includes losses reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(2)

According to the Consumer Federation of America, Americans are losing an estimated $119,000,000,000 each year to online scams.

(3)

Investigative reporting, Federal indictments, and sanctions designations issued by the Department of the Treasury have revealed the extent to which foreign malicious cybercriminal organizations collaborate with foreign governments, illicit finance actors, and foreign militia groups whose activities present a threat to the economic and national security of the United States.

(4)

Foreign malicious cybercriminal organizations rely extensively on communications and financial services of United States companies, enabling the organizations' targeting of vulnerable Americans.

(5)

Financial insecurity generated by foreign malicious cybercriminal organizations presents a counterintelligence threat to the United States intelligence community.

(1) In general

It is the sense of Congress that—

(2) Hostile foreign cyber actors

The hostile foreign cyber actors described in paragraph (1) include, at a minimum, the following:

(1) In general

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall submit to Congress a report on hostile foreign cyber actors, such as foreign scam centers.

(2) Contents

The report required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(3) Form; public availability

The report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. The unclassified form of the report shall be made available to the public.

(1)

in paragraph (1), by striking includes and inserting means; and

(2)

in paragraph (5)—

(1) Covered foreign country

The term covered foreign country means any of the following:

(2) Covered foreign entity

The term covered foreign entity means an entity that is domiciled in a covered foreign country, or subject to influence or control by the government of a covered foreign country as determined by the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Secretary of Defense, and any subsidiary or affiliate of such an entity.

(3) Covered unmanned ground vehicle system

The term covered unmanned ground vehicle system—

(1) In general

Except as provided under paragraph (2), the head of an element of the intelligence community may not procure any covered unmanned ground vehicle system that is manufactured or assembled by a covered foreign entity.

(2) Exemption

The heads of elements of the intelligence community are exempt from the restriction under paragraph (1) if the procurement is required in the national interest of the United States and—

(1) Prohibition

(2) Exemption

The heads of the elements of the intelligence community are exempt from the restriction under paragraph (1) if the operation is required in the national interest of the United States and—

(1) In general

Beginning on the date that is one year after the date of the enactment of this Act and except as provided in paragraph (2), no Federal funds awarded to an element of the intelligence community through a contract, grant, or cooperative agreement, or otherwise made available may be used—

(2) Exemption

The heads of elements of the intelligence community are exempt from the restriction under paragraph (1) if the procurement or operation is required in the national interest of the United States and—

(1)

The synchronization of all intelligence community efforts related to China-Taiwan indications and warning, including the generation of indicators and development of collection requirements related to such indicators.

(2)

The coordination of analysis related to China-Taiwan indications and warning and the development of analytic methodologies for use across the intelligence community in conducting analysis related to China-Taiwan indications and warning.

(3)

The development and implementation of information technology solutions to synchronize the access of the intelligence community to information relating to indications and warning.

(1)

The Director of National Intelligence.

(2)

The Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security.

(3)

The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

(4)

The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

(5)

The Director for Intelligence for the United States Indo-Pacific Command.

(6)

The Director of the National-Geospatial Intelligence Agency.

(7)

The Director of the National Security Agency.

(8)

The Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis.

(9)

The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research.

(10)

Such other heads of the elements of the intelligence community that the Director of National Intelligence and the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security determine appropriate.

(1) Co-chairs

The Director of National Intelligence (or a designee of the Director) and the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (or a designee of the Undersecretary) shall be co-chairs of the Task Force.

(2) Working groups

The Task Force may create subordinate working groups as determined by the co-chairs.

(3) Meeting frequency

The Task Force shall meet regularly but not less than quarterly.

(1) In general

The Task Force may hire staff and create joint duty assignments assigned to the Task Force. The Task Force may not exceed 25 full-time equivalent staff in total.

(2) Agency liaison

Each member listed in subsection (b) shall appoint a senior intelligence officer from the agency concerned to serve as a liaison to the Task Force. Such liaison shall be responsible for coordinating the participation and support of the agency concerned to the Task Force.

(1)

a summary of the efforts of the intelligence community with respect to China-Taiwan indications and warning;

(2)

a summary of efforts by the Task Force to develop a common set of indicators and organize collection efforts by the intelligence community against such indicators;

(3)

a description of the resources provided by each Task Force member towards efforts with respect to China-Taiwan indications and warning, disaggregated by—

(4)

recommendations to improve the collection and analysis of the intelligence community with respect to China-Taiwan indications and warning.

(1) In general

Paragraph (1) of subsection (e) of section 6604 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (50 U.S.C. 3334m note; division F of Public Law 119–60) is amended to read as follows:

(1) Covered application

The term covered application means—

(A)

the DeepSeek application or any successor application or service; or

(B)

any product or service from any entity of the People's Republic of China that is included on—

(i)

the Entity List maintained by the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce;

(ii)

the list (sometimes known as the Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies List) maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury under Executive Order 13959, as amended by Executive Order 14032 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to addressing the threat from securities investments that finance certain companies of the People’s Republic of China), or any successor order; or

(iii)

the list of Chinese military companies required under section 1260H of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (10 U.S.C. 113 note; Public Law 116–283) and maintained by the Department of Defense.

(2) Conforming amendment

The heading for such section is amended by striking DeepSeek and inserting products and services from People's Republic of China.

(1)

in the section heading, by striking by Federal Bureau of Investigation;

(2)

in subsection (a)—

(3)

in subsection (b), by striking the Director (or a designee of the Director, as applicable) approves a recommendation pursuant to subsection (a)(3), the Director shall and inserting the head of an element of the intelligence community approves a recommendation pursuant to subsection (a)(3), the head shall;

(4)

in subsection (c), by amending paragraph (2) to read as follows:

(2) People's Republic of China product or service

The term People's Republic of China product or service means—

(A)

an information or communication technology product manufactured in China, Hong Kong, or Macau and designed, developed, or maintained by a firm that is domiciled in China, Hong Kong, or Macau; or

(B)

an information or communication technology product or service provided or manufactured by—

(i)

an entity that is fully or partially owned or controlled by, or otherwise connected to, the government of China; or

(ii)

an entity included on the list submitted by the Director of National Intelligence under section 6706(c) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (division F of Public Law 119–60; 139 Stat. 1648).

(1)

by striking subsection (c); and

(2)

by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c).

(1)

by striking subsections (c) and (d); and

(2)

by redesignating subsections (e) and (f) as subsections (c) and (d), respectively.

(1)

by striking subsection (c); and

(2)

by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c).

(1)

by striking subsection (c); and

(2)

by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c).

(1)

by striking subsection (c); and

(2)

by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c).

(1) List required

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, shall develop a list of products, intellectual property, technology, and any other objects that the Directors determine—

(2) Form

The list required by paragraph (1) may be in classified form.

(1)

may waive the prohibition in subsection (c) for the element on a case by case basis if the head determines that in the particular case, sending or receiving any product, intellectual property, technology, or other object by an entity identified pursuant to subsection (b) is necessary for the national security of the United States; and

(2)

not later than 3 days after issuing such waiver, shall notify the Director of National Intelligence of the waiver.

(1)

a justification for the waiver, including the product, intellectual property, technology, or other object subject to the waiver; and

(2)

a description of the national security threat mitigation measures implemented for permitting the activity that otherwise would be prohibited under subsection (c).

(1) In general

The Director of National Intelligence shall, acting in close coordination with such heads of elements of the intelligence community as the Director considers relevant and the members of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance, undertake efforts to bolster and improve—

(2) Priority areas for enhanced cooperation

Efforts undertaken pursuant to paragraph (1) shall include efforts—

(1) In general

Section 3 of the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8902) is amended—

(2) Definition

Section 2 of such Act (22 U.S.C. 8901) is amended—

(1) In general

Intelligence support to Ukraine required under this section shall not be suspended or limited unless the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, identifies a specific and identifiable national security concern.

(2) Notification

Not later than 15 days after making the decision to pause, terminate, restrict, or otherwise materially downgrade intelligence support to Ukraine, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a notification that includes—

(3) Form

A notification submitted under paragraph (2) shall be in unclassified form, but may include an classified annex.

(1) In general

If Ukraine and the Russian Federation voluntarily and freely enter into an armistice or a comprehensive political settlement, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of the other relevant elements of the intelligence community, shall adjust the intelligence support to Ukraine to support implementation of the armistice or the comprehensive political settlement and, consistent with the national security interests of the United States, support building and sustaining the capacity of Ukraine to detect, deter, and repel any future Russian attack against the territory of Ukraine.

(2) Report on modifications to United States intelligence support

Not later than 30 days after an armistice or a comprehensive political settlement is entered into force, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, in coordination with the heads of the other relevant elements of the intelligence community, including the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, and the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report that includes—

(3) Form

The report required by paragraph (2) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(4) Early warning

The Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of any other relevant elements of the intelligence community, shall provide to Ukraine and member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization intelligence and early warning to allow for an appropriate and timely response with respect to any potential attack or act of aggression against Ukraine by the Russian Federation.

(5) Notification

(1) In general

In the event of an armed attack by the Russian Federation on Ukraine that violates an armistice or a comprehensive political settlement, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the heads of other relevant elements of the intelligence community, shall immediately resume the provision of intelligence support to the Government of Ukraine at a level the Directors deem necessary to support military operations of the Government of Ukraine that are intended, or reasonably expected, to help the Armed Forces of Ukraine defend or liberate the territory of Ukraine and prevent such territory of Ukraine from being occupied or attacked by the Russian Federation.

(2) Notification

(3) Sunset

(1) Armistice; comprehensive political settlement

The terms armistice and comprehensive political settlement mean a formal written agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the Russian Federation that has the effect of permanently ending the armed conflict between both nations.

(2) Intelligence support

The term intelligence support means activities authorized under the provisions of law governing the heads of the elements of the intelligence community, including the collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of information, intelligence, and imagery.

(3) Specific and identifiable national security concern

The term specific and identifiable national security concern includes the following:

(4) Territory of Ukraine

The term territory of Ukraine means all territory internationally recognized to be the sovereign territory of Ukraine on February 19, 2014, including Crimea and the territory that the Russian Federation claims to have annexed in Kherson and Zaporizhzia.

(1)

to maintain and strengthen the strategic security partnership with Israel as a means of advancing the national defense of the United States, regional stability, and the protection of United States personnel and interests in the Middle East;

(2)

to enhance intelligence collaboration through robust intelligence sharing and analytic partnership with Israel to counter terrorism, proliferation networks, cyber threats, state and nonstate aggressors, terror financing, sanctions evasion, and other transnational security challenges that threaten both Israel and the United States;

(3)

to deter and counter destabilizing activities by the Government of Iran and Iran-aligned state and nonstate actors that threaten Israel, United States forces, and regional partners;

(4)

to ensure that security assistance and defense cooperation are structured to help Israel maintain its qualitative military edge, consistent with United States law and broader regional security considerations;

(5)

to encourage and support the expansion of regional security architectures that include Israel and willing regional partners, with a focus on integrated air and missile defense, maritime security, early warning systems, and intelligence-sharing frameworks; and

(6)

to leverage security coordination with Israel to enhance force protection, early warning, and crisis response capabilities for United States military and diplomatic personnel in the region.

(1)

Israel remains a critical United States security partner whose defense and intelligence capabilities provide a strategic advantage that contributes to enhanced operational effectiveness and technological superiority;

(2)

timely and actionable intelligence sharing between the United States and Israel has saved United States personnel and property in the region and should remain a central pillar of the bilateral security relationship;

(3)

the evolving threat environment in the Middle East—including missile proliferation, unmanned systems, cyber operations, terror financing, and proxy warfare—requires sustained and adaptive cooperation between the United States and Israel;

(4)

the United States-Israel security partnership has historically benefitted from bipartisan support, which strengthens the partnership's credibility, durability, and deterrent value; and

(5)

expanding normalization and practical security cooperation between Israel and regional states can serve as a force multiplier for collective deterrence and integrated defense.

(1) In general

Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

1115. Requirements relating to intelligence sharing

(a) Intelligence sharing with Israel

(1) In general

The President, acting through the Director of National Intelligence and, as necessary, the Secretary of Defense, shall, subject to applicable law and the protection of intelligence sources and methods, expand and enhance intelligence sharing with the Government of Israel.

(2) Scope of intelligence sharing

Intelligence sharing carried out under this subsection shall include the sharing of information relating to cybersecurity threats, terrorism, sanctions evasion, plans and intentions of state and nonstate actors, adversarial technology proliferation, missile threats, unmanned aerial systems, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, air and space domain awareness, and other aerial threats relevant to the defense of Israel, United States forces and interests in the region, and regional security partners.

(3) Limitations on reduction of intelligence sharing

(A) In general

Intelligence sharing and related security information exchanges with the Government of Israel shall not be suspended, reduced, or otherwise materially limited except on the basis of a specific and identifiable national security concern determined by the President, such as the protection of intelligence sources and methods, counterintelligence risk, or another significant security consideration.

(B) Documentation requirement

The President shall document any determination to suspend, reduce, or otherwise materially limit intelligence sharing or related security information exchanges with the Government of Israel, including a description of the national security rationale supporting the change.

(4) Congressional notification

(A) In general

Not later than 15 days after the date of any decision to materially increase, suspend, reduce, or otherwise alter intelligence sharing or related security information exchanges with the Government of Israel, the President shall notify the congressional intelligence committees of such decision.

(B) Elements

Each notification required by subparagraph (A) shall include the following:

(i)

A description of the change in intelligence sharing or security information exchange.

(ii)

The categories of information affected.

(iii)

The national security objectives served by the change.

(iv)

In the case of a suspension or reduction, the specific national security concern supporting the change.

(v)

An assessment of the anticipated impact on regional security, United States forces, and integrated air and missile defense cooperation.

(b) Intelligence sharing and analytic cooperation with Abraham Accords countries

(1) In general

The President, acting through the Director of National Intelligence and, as necessary, the Secretary of Defense, shall, consistent with applicable law and security agreements, expand and enhance intelligence sharing and analytic cooperation with countries that have normalized relations with Israel pursuant to the Abraham Accords (as defined in section 64(k) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2735a(k)) in order to strengthen regional security integration.

(2) Priority areas

In carrying out paragraph (1), the President shall prioritize the sharing of appropriate intelligence and information relating to—

(A)

counterterrorism threats and networks, including state and nonstate aggressors, and terror financing;

(B)

cybersecurity threats, vulnerabilities, and defensive best practices;

(C)

air and missile defense early warning and threat tracking;

(D)

geospatial, overhead, and other imaging intelligence relevant to shared security concerns; and

(E)

maritime security threats, including threats to freedom of navigation, commercial shipping, sanctions evasion, and regional maritime stability.

(3) Safeguards

(A) Adoption of guidelines

The Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall adopt guidelines for intelligence sharing and analytic cooperation carried out under this subsection that ensure appropriate safeguards—

(i)

to protect intelligence sources and methods; and

(ii)

to ensure that recipients maintain adequate security protections consistent with United States requirements.

(B) Restrictions on access

If the Director of National Intelligence determines that a recipient of intelligence sharing or analytic cooperation carried out under this subsection has any intelligence, defense, or technological information sharing relationship with an adversarial nation, the Director shall restrict all access of such recipient to such intelligence sharing and analytic cooperation.

(c) Report required

(1) In general

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this section, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the status of United States intelligence sharing with the Government Israel and, as appropriate, regional partners.

(2) Matters to be included

Each report required by paragraph (1) shall include, to the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, the following:

(A)

A description of the categories of intelligence and security information shared by the United States Government with the Government of Israel.

(B)

An assessment of progress toward seamlessly integrating Israel into regional air and missile defense and early warning architectures with partner countries, including those that have normalized relations with Israel pursuant to the Abraham Accords.

(C)

A description of how such intelligence sharing has contributed, if at all, to—

(i)

improved detection, tracking, warning, interception, or deterrence of aerial threats, including missiles and unmanned systems, for Israel, United States forces, or regional partners; and

(ii)

the overall stability and coordination of security in the region.

(D)

An assessment of progress in improving interoperability among technology networks of the United States, Israel, and partner countries.

(E)

A description of efforts to secure technology networks and data from cyber threats and unauthorized access.

(F)

An identification of any legal, policy, technical, counterintelligence, or security barriers limiting deeper intelligence integration, including risks to intelligence sources and methods.

(G)

A summary of any significant increases or reductions in intelligence sharing during the reporting period and the national security rationale for such changes.

(3) Form

Each report required by paragraph (1) report shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

(4) Appropriate congressional committees defined

In this subsection, the term appropriate congressional committees means—

(A)

the congressional intelligence committees; and

(B)

to the extent Department of Defense information is implicated, the congressional defense committees (as defined in section 101(a) of title 10, United States Code).

(2) Clerical amendment

The table of contents for such Act is amended by adding at the end the following:

(1) Artificial intelligence model

The term artificial intelligence model means a capability or series of capabilities combined that can, for a given set of objectives, generate outputs such as predictions, recommendations, or decisions without human intervention or input.

(2) Center

The term Center means the Artificial Intelligence Security Center of the National Security Agency.

(3) Classified information

The term classified information has the meaning given such term in section 805 of the National Security Act of 1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3164).

(4) Cleared industry personnel

The term cleared industry personnel means employees or representatives of a covered person who hold an appropriate security clearance and have a demonstrated need to know.

(5) Congressional intelligence committees

The term congressional intelligence committees has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3003).

(6) covered person

The term covered person means a non-Federal person who—

(7) Director

The term Director means the Director of the National Security Agency.

(8) Intelligence

The term intelligence has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3003).

(9) Intelligence community

The term intelligence community has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3003).

(10) Security clearance

The term security clearance means an authorization to access classified information.

(11) Threat information

The term threat information means information on—

(1) In general

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall, acting through the Center, establish a pilot program to assess the feasibility and advisability of facilitating the secure sharing with covered persons of intelligence and threat information germane to the exploitation of access to United States artificial intelligence systems and enabling infrastructure to engage in intelligence collection, intellectual property theft, and other malicious activities.

(2) Participation

The Director may not select covered persons to participate in the pilot in a manner that provides a competitive advantage or procurement preference to any covered person, to the detriment of another covered person.

(3) Duration

The Director shall carry out the pilot program established pursuant to paragraph (1) during the 3-year period beginning on the date of the establishment of the pilot program.

(1) Criteria

The Director shall establish criteria governing engagement with covered persons under the pilot program required by subsection (b), which may include criteria relating to the following:

(2) Nature of participation

Participation in the pilot program shall not be construed as a certification, endorsement, or regulatory approval by the United States Government of any artificial intelligence system or commercial activity and the Director may not exclude a covered person from participating on the basis of political or ideological viewpoints of the covered person or its employees.

(1) Authorized Modes

Under the pilot program required by subsection (b), the Director may, acting through the Center, authorize the sharing of intelligence and threat information as described in paragraph (1) of such subsection through—

(2) Limitation

Any mechanism established under this section shall be limited to the dissemination of intelligence and threat information and shall not establish standards, requirements, or best practices governing artificial intelligence development or deployment.

(1) Procedures required

The Director shall, acting through the Center, codify procedures to tailor, sanitize, or downgrade the classification level of intelligence shared under the pilot program required by subsection (b) to ensure usability while protecting intelligence sources and methods.

(2) Examples of procedures

The procedures developed under paragraph (1) may include the following:

(3) Handling requirements

The Director shall, acting through the Center, codify policies governing the handling, storage, and dissemination of intelligence shared under the pilot program required by subsection (b), including audit and compliance mechanisms.

(1) Permissible use

Intelligence shared under the pilot program required by subsection (b) may be used solely for detecting, preventing, or mitigating malicious foreign activity exploiting access to United States artificial intelligence systems and enabling infrastructure to engage in intelligence collection, intellectual property theft, and other malicious activities.

(2) Nondisclosure

A covered person may not disclose to any person who is not a covered person or an element of the intelligence community any intelligence shared with the covered person under the pilot program required by subsection (b), except as expressly authorized by the Director acting through the Center.

(1) Evaluation

The Director shall, acting through the Center, continuously evaluate the effectiveness and risks of the pilot program established under subsection (b).

(2) Report

(1)

to authorize the collection of intelligence on United States persons not authorized by another provision of law;

(2)

to require the disclosure of classified information to unauthorized persons; or

(3)

to establish commercial, competition, or technology policy outside the purview of the intelligence community.

(1)

shall be exempt from disclosure and withheld, without discretion, from the public, pursuant to section 552(b)(3)(B) of title 5, United States Code, and any other provision of United States law or law of any State, political subdivision or agency thereof, or Tribe requiring disclosure of information or records; and

(2)

shall not be deemed a waiver of any applicable privilege or protection, including trade secret protection.

(1) Director

The term Director means the Director of National Intelligence.

(2) Intelligence

The term Intelligence has the meaning given the term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

(1) Policy and procedure reviews

(2) Workflow reviews

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall review and assess all workflows of the intelligence community that incorporate artificial intelligence used by the United States to inform targeting decisions with lethal effects.

(1)

assess ways in which frontier artificial intelligence models could exhibit bias or cause errors that undermine intelligence or other information provided by the intelligence community that informs targeting accuracy;

(2)

identify the specific point and cause of error; and

(3)

provide proposed process mitigations to catch and correct such mistakes.

(1) In general

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the reviews and assessments carried out under subsection (b) as well as a summary of any new policies and directives issued pursuant to subsection (e).

(2) Contents

The report required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(3) Form

The report submitted pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(1)

in subsection (b)—

(2)

in subsection (d), by adding at the end the following:

(3) Process for review of artificial intelligence testing methodologies and benchmarks

Consistent with applicable classification and access policies, the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, in coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of each element of the intelligence community, shall—

(A)

establish a process to review artificial intelligence testing methodologies and benchmarks employed within each element; and

(B)

ensure such methodologies and benchmarks remain commensurate with the capabilities and impacts of systems being evaluated. ; and

(3)

by adding at the end the following:

(f) Process to systematically track and evaluate incidents

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this subsection, the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, in coordination with the National Manager for National Security Systems, shall establish a process to systematically track and evaluate incidents associated with compromises to the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of artificial intelligence systems within each element of the intelligence community.

(g) Policies for agentic artificial intelligence systems and processes

(1) Definition of agentic artificial intelligence system or process

In this subsection, the term agentic artificial intelligence system or process—

(A)

means an artificial intelligence system or process that, given an objective or instruction—

(i)

determines the action or sequence of actions to be taken to accomplish that objective; and

(ii)

is capable of executing such actions directly on information systems, data, or external services; and

(B)

does not include a system or process that solely generates informational or advisory output for a human operator to act upon.

(2) Review of the adequacy of existing identity, credential, and access management systems for information within the intelligence community

(A) In general

Consistent with authority under section 102A(g) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(g)), the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the National Manager for National Security Systems, shall—

(i)

not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this paragraph, complete a review of the adequacy of existing identity, credential, and access management systems for information within the intelligence community used by agentic artificial intelligence systems and processes; and

(ii)

not permit access to any information within the intelligence community by an external department or agency for use in an agentic artificial intelligence system or process until the review required by clause (i) is completed.

(B) Evaluation of effectiveness of mechanisms for agentic artificial intelligence systems and processes to authenticate as non-human actors

The review required by subparagraph (A)(i) shall include an evaluation of the effectiveness of mechanisms for agentic artificial intelligence systems and processes to authenticate as non-human actors, including the appropriate delegation of clearance entitlements and the traceability of any action taken by an agentic artificial intelligence system or process to a cleared individual on whose behalf the agentic artificial intelligence system or process is acting.

(3) Policy guidance

Upon completion of the review required by paragraph (2), the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the National Security Agency, the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, and the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, shall issue appropriate policy guidance on—

(A)

the use of agentic artificial intelligence systems and processes within the intelligence community; and

(B)

the access of agentic artificial intelligence systems and processes to information within the intelligence community.

(4) Specific issues relating to agentic artificial intelligence systems and processes

In carrying out paragraph (3), the Director of National Intelligence, at a minimum and to the extent such requirements are not already replicated in existing processes or policies, consider—

(A)

establishing a taxonomy of autonomy and security risks associated with agentic artificial intelligence systems and processes that operate on, or have the possibility of accessing, information within the intelligence community; and

(B)

establishing technical controls, processes, and other mitigation measures to address the risks identified under subparagraph (A), including, at a minimum—

(i)

requirements that any element of the intelligence community or external department or agency incorporating information from an intelligence community element as part of an agentic artificial intelligence system or process provide the relevant element of the intelligence community controlling such information with documentation of—

(I)

the properties of the agentic artificial intelligence system or process, including the range of additional systems or data sources it may access (whether as a system or process input or as an agent action), the permissions and classification entitlements associated with such access, as well as any relevant model or system documentation, such as model and system cards;

(II)

anticipated mission use cases for any access to information within the intelligence community in the context of an agentic artificial intelligence system or process, including whether any use case constitutes a high-impact artificial intelligence use as those terms are defined under existing Federal policies;

(III)

procedures to notify relevant intelligence community elements controlling such information of any changes to the properties of the agentic artificial intelligence system or process, to permissions and classification entitlements, or to anticipated use cases of such system or process, that might significantly limit the utility, confidentiality, integrity, or availability of such information; and

(IV)

procedures for intelligence community elements to promptly notify external intelligence community elements or departments or agencies of any material changes to upstream classified data or systems that might significantly limit or impair the utility, confidentiality, integrity, or availability of any downstream agentic artificial intelligence system or process maintained by that external intelligence community element or department or agency;

(ii)

policies and procedures to log any actions, as well as associated inputs, taken by an agentic artificial intelligence system or process to information within the intelligence community, including mechanisms to reverse or negate unauthorized actions or actions that pose a risk to the user intent or confidentiality, integrity, or availability of such information;

(iii)

policies and procedures for safeguards, continuous monitoring, and the detection of security incidents or other unexpected behavior of an agentic artificial intelligence system or process, or failures of associated safeguards, that may pose a threat to the confidentiality, availability, or integrity of information within the intelligence community;

(iv)

policies and procedures for system-level controls of agentic artificial intelligence systems and processes, tailored to address each system or process component; and

(v)

criteria for the selection of interoperability standards for agentic artificial intelligence systems and processes, with preference, to the extent practicable, for standards that are openly specified, governed in a vendor-neutral manner, supported by multiple model providers, extensible to future requirements, and subject to ongoing independent security review.

(A)

by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); and

(B)

by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new paragraph (3):

(3)

Making available a research test-bed to private sector and academic researchers, on a subsidized basis, to engage in artificial intelligence security research, including through the secure provision of access in a secure environment for pre-deployment testing of to proprietary third-party models with the consent of the vendors of the models.;

(1)

an artificial intelligence capability or series of capabilities combined that has not previously been included in an intelligence community element’s inventory of artificial intelligence use cases consistent with guidance issued pursuant to section 6702(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (50 U.S.C. 3334m(b));

(2)

a use of an artificial intelligence capability that contravenes a restriction on the use of artificial intelligence contained in such an inventory; or

(3)

a use of an artificial intelligence capability that constitutes a high-impact artificial intelligence use as that term is defined under policies of the executive branch.

(1)

hardware and software requirements;

(2)

the proposed application of the technology;

(3)

the risks and advantages assessed with respect to the proposed novel use;

(4)

any specific risk mitigation measures contemplated, including measures specific to the proposed novel use;

(5)

any test and evaluation activities conducted in conjunction with the proposed novel use;

(6)

any additional test and evaluation activity that is still needed, and whether the intelligence community has resources to conduct and fund such activity; and

(7)

any estimated cost increases anticipated in connection with the proposed novel use.

(A)

that artificial intelligence was used;

(B)

the artificial intelligence system or model used;

(C)

the manner in which, or task for which, the artificial intelligence was used; and

(D)

a point of contact such as the relevant Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer, who can address questions about data inputs, system access, or artificial intelligence system performance; and

(1)

the identification of scenarios in which artificial intelligence capabilities could contribute to inadvertent escalation with foreign nations or actors, including—

(2)

a simulation of select scenarios to discern where miscommunication or miscalculations have a higher likelihood of occurrence; and

(3)

(1) Congress

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, or 30 days after the date of completion of the research campaign required by subsection (a), whichever occurs first, the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, in coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, shall brief the congressional intelligence committees on the findings and recommendations of the research campaign.

(2) Intelligence community

The Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, in coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, shall brief the heads and Chief Artificial Intelligence Officers of the elements of the intelligence community on the findings and recommendations of the research campaign required by subsection (a), as appropriate.

(1)

pursue sandbox demonstrations with frontier artificial intelligence models or leverage other tactics necessary to uncover vulnerabilities to intelligence community systems, infrastructure, or personnel that may result from—

(2)

pursue findings, including—

(1) Congress

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, or 30 days after the date of completion of the research campaign required by subsection (a), whichever occurs first, the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, in coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, shall brief the congressional intelligence committees on the findings and recommendations of the research campaign.

(2) Intelligence community

The Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, in coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, shall brief the heads and Chief Artificial Intelligence Officers of the elements of the intelligence community on the findings and recommendations of the research campaign required by subsection (a), as appropriate.

(1) Artificial intelligence technology

The term artificial intelligence technology means—

(2) Commerce Control List

The term Commerce Control List means the Commerce Control List set forth in Supplement No. 1 to part 774 of the Export Administration Regulations.

(3) United States artificial intelligence stack

The term United States artificial intelligence stack means the United States artificial intelligence integrated circuits, cloud infrastructure, and models.

(4) Export control terms

The terms export, Export Administration Regulations, in-country transfer, reexport, and United States person have the meanings given those terms in section 1742 of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801).

(1)

the recipient country’s export control system with respect to artificial intelligence technology, including integrated circuits, integrated circuit design software, tools, and manufacturing equipment;

(2)

information on any past, present, or expected interactions, including commercial ties and cooperation, between commercial entities or government entities in the recipient country and other countries of proliferation concern, including the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation;

(3)

actual or suspected transfers of artificial intelligence technology to such countries, including the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation;

(4)

the consequences that onward proliferation of United States artificial intelligence technology from the recipient would have for United States efforts to both deny adversaries access to advanced artificial intelligence technology and maintain a significant competitive advantage in frontier artificial intelligence development, integrated design, and integrated manufacturing, especially relative to the progress of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation;

(5)

the capacity of the intelligence community and United States commercial entities to have near real-time awareness of the any potential technology leakage or export violations by the recipient country;

(6)

potential measures that the intelligence community assesses could reasonably be taken by the recipient country to mitigate both the proliferation concerns identified by the intelligence community and the consequences of any potential onward proliferation as detailed in paragraph (4);

(7)

in the case of the grant of a license, specific measures that the intelligence community will take to evaluate compliance with any associated restrictions or compliance requirements;

(8)

whether export of artificial intelligence technology would reinforce United States artificial intelligence dominance;

(9)

the intended and likely end-uses, including military, intelligence, and domestic surveillance applications, and whether such uses are consistent with United States national security interests; and

(10)

current and planned agreements and arrangements between the United States and the government of the recipient country.

(1) Artificial intelligence security vulnerability

The term artificial intelligence security vulnerability means a weakness in an artificial intelligence system that could be exploited by a third party to subvert, without authorization, the privacy, integrity, or availability of an artificial intelligence system, including through techniques such as—

(2) Artificial intelligence system

The term artificial intelligence system means a capability or series of capabilities combined that can, for a given set of objectives, generate outputs such as predictions, recommendations, or decisions without human intervention or input.

(3) Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process document

The term Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process document means the executive branch document entitled Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process for the United States Government dated November 15, 2017.

(4) Vulnerabilities Equities Process

The term Vulnerabilities Equities Process means the interagency review of vulnerabilities carried out pursuant to the Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process document or any successor document.

(1)

evaluate whether the existing Vulnerabilities Equities Process sufficiently accommodates the submission and review of artificial intelligence security vulnerabilities; and

(2)

submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report describing the applicability of the Vulnerabilities Equities Process to such vulnerabilities, including whether the submission and review of such vulnerabilities under the Vulnerabilities Equities Process would result in an unduly large volume of notifications to affected vendors and, if so, an assessment of mechanisms to manage the volume of such notifications.

(1)

the volume of vulnerabilities of information systems identified by artificial intelligence systems;

(2)

the impact of any change in such volume on the functioning of the Vulnerabilities Equities Process; and

(3)

whether the increasingly rapid discovery and exploitation of such vulnerabilities by external cyber actors using artificial intelligence systems materially alters the equity of disclosure.

(1)

the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency;

(2)

the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and

(3)

other entities as the Director of the National Security Agency considers appropriate.

(1) Artificial intelligence model

The term artificial intelligence model means a capability or series of capabilities combined that can, for a given set of objectives, generate outputs such as predictions, recommendations, or decisions without human intervention or input.

(2) Child pornography

The term child pornography has the meaning given that term in section 2256 of title 18, United States Code.

(3) Covered application

The term covered application means any specific artificial intelligence model that has been confirmed by a head of an element of the intelligence community, or their designee, as—

(4) Intimate visual depiction

The term intimate visual depiction has the meaning given that term in section 1309 of the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022 (15 U.S.C. 6851).

(1) In general

The acquisition or use of any covered application on national security systems operated by an element of the intelligence community or by a contractor of such element is prohibited unless the appropriate safeguards described in subsection (c) can be implemented.

(2) Implementation

(1) In general

The head of an element of the intelligence community may implement additional safeguards that prohibit the generation of child pornography or non-consensual intimate visual depictions of an identifiable adult or a minor.

(2) Certification required

The head of an element of the intelligence community shall certify to the Director of National Intelligence that safeguards implemented under paragraph (1) are sufficient to prevent misuse of covered applications to generate child pornography or intimate visual depictions of a minor.

(3) Congressional notification

The head of an element of the intelligence community that issues a certification pursuant to paragraph (2) shall notify the congressional intelligence committees of such certification not later than 7 days after issuing such certification. Such a notification shall identify the safeguards implemented pursuant to paragraph (1).

(1) In general

The head of an element of the intelligence community may issue a waiver for any artificial intelligence model that would otherwise be subject to the prohibition under subsection (b) if the head identifies a national security or research justification for such artificial intelligence model that benefits the intelligence community.

(2) Congressional notification

Not later than 7 days after issuing a waiver pursuant to paragraph (1), the head of the element of the intelligence community that issues such waiver shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a notification that includes—

(A)

in clause (i), by redesignating subclauses (I) and (II) as items (aa) and (bb), respectively, and adjusting the margins accordingly;

(B)

by redesignating clauses (i) and (ii) as subclauses (I) and (II), respectively, and adjusting the margins accordingly;

(C)

by striking If any of the information and inserting the following:

(i) In general

If a portion of the information; and

(D)

by adding at the end the following:

(ii) Full classification

Notwithstanding paragraphs (5) and (6), if the classification of information required to be included in the transition plan of a Federal entity prohibits even the public release of a redacted transition plan, as determined by the head of the Federal entity, the Federal entity shall—

(I)

notify the NTIA that the entire transition plan must be classified and that even a redacted version cannot be made public; and

(II)

classify the transition plan in accordance with the levels of materials contained in the transition plan.; and

(A)

by striking For purposes of and inserting the following:

(1) In general

For purposes of; and

(B)

by adding at the end the following:

(2) Elements of the intelligence community

Notwithstanding paragraph (1) or any other provision of this part, each element of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)) shall be considered a Federal entity and shall be eligible to receive payment from the Spectrum Relocation Fund for any auction-related relocation or sharing costs incurred by the element regardless of the existence of a Government station license.

(1) In general

Chapter 11 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

1127. Protection of classified information relating to budget functions

(a) Protection of classified information

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, not later than September 30, 2028, each covered official shall ensure that the department or agency of the official uses secure systems that meet the requirements to protect classified information, including with respect to the location at which the system is located or accessed, to carry out any of the following activities of the department or agency:

(1)

Formulating, developing, and submitting the budget of the department or agency (including the budget justification materials submitted to Congress) under the National Intelligence Program.

(2)

Apportioning, allotting, issuing warrants for the disbursement of, and obligating and expending funds under the National Intelligence Program.

(3)

Carrying out Federal financial management service functions or related activities of the intelligence community.

(b) Waiver

The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, may issue a waiver to a head of an element of the intelligence community with respect to a requirement under subsection (a) if the Director of National Intelligence certifies to the congressional intelligence committees that—

(1)

one or more of the Federal financial management service functions or related activities of the element under the National Intelligence Program—

(A)

are appropriately carried out using a system that does not meet the requirements to protect classified information; and

(B)

such use does not represent a significant counterintelligence risk; or

(2)

complying with a specified requirement under subsection (a) would result in an increased counterintelligence threat to a classified program or activity.

(c) Display of information in public reports

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in making public a report or other information relating to expenditures by an element of the intelligence community, a covered official may modify or omit information relating to such expenditures in a manner necessary to ensure the protection of classified information.

(d) Definitions

In this section:

(1) Covered official

The term covered official means the following:

(A)

The Secretary of the Treasury.

(B)

The Director of the Office of Management and Budget.

(C)

Each head of an element of the intelligence community.

(D)

Any other head of a department or agency of the Federal Government carrying out a function specified in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection (a).

(2) Federal financial management service functions

In this section, the term Federal financial management service functions means standard functions, as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, that departments and agencies of the Federal Government perform relating to Federal financial management, including budget execution, financial asset information management, payable management, revenue management, reimbursable management, receivable management, delinquent debt management, cost management, general ledger management, financial reconciliation, and financial and performance reporting.

(3) Intelligence community terms

The terms congressional intelligence committees, intelligence community, and National Intelligence Program have the meaning given those terms in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

(2) Clerical amendment

The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 11 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1126 the following new item:

(1) Reimbursement

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, of the amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available to the Director of National Intelligence under the Intelligence Community Management Account that are available until September 30, 2028, the Director may reimburse a covered official for amounts that the official incurred to implement section 1127(a) of title 31, United States Code, as added by subsection (a).

(2) Report

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the heads of the elements of the intelligence community shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence committees a detailed cost estimate associated with the implementation of the requirements under section 1127(a) of title 31, United States Code, as added by subsection (a).

(3) Covered official defined

In this subsection, the term covered official has the meaning given that term in section 1127(d) of title 31, United States Code, as added by subsection (a).

(1)

in paragraph (1), by striking or at the end;

(2)

in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and inserting ; or; and

(3)

by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

(3)

information that the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, determines would result in the exposure of classified programs or activities, including such information that could, when combined with other publicly available information, reveal classified programs or activities.

(1)

in subparagraph (B)(ii)(II)(bb)(AA), by inserting , facility owned or operated by an element of the intelligence community, after military installation; and

(2)

in subparagraph (C)(ii), by inserting , facility owned or operated by an element of the intelligence community, after military installation.

(1)

brief the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System on foreign threats to the Federal Reserve System; and

(2)

work with the Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to create and implement standardized security and classification measures for protecting information collected, generated, and stored by the Federal Reserve System.

(1)

the congressional intelligence committees;

(2)

the Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and

(3)

the Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives.

(1)

by inserting , collected, or paid after charged; and

(2)

by inserting or for the award of such license or other authorization after this part.

(1)

in the subsection heading, by inserting ; prohibition after Exemptions; and

(2)

by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

(3) Prohibition

No fee may be charged, collected, or paid in connection with the execution of a qualified divestiture.

(1)

in paragraph (1), by striking or at the end;

(2)

in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon; and

(3)

by adding at the end the following:

(3)

the victim is—

(A)

a natural person who is a citizen or permanent resident alien of the United States; or

(B)

a person, including an organization, headquartered or incorporated in the United States; or

(4)

an act committed in furtherance of the offense used or took place through—

(A)

communications in interstate or foreign commerce; or

(B)

financial infrastructure in the United States.

(1)

in section 1831, by adding at the end the following:

(c) Incitement or solicitation of economic espionage

(1) In general

It shall be unlawful for a person to solicit, command, induce, or otherwise endeavor to persuade another person to engage in an offense described in subsection (a).

(2) Penalties

Any person who violates paragraph (1) shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.; and

(2)

in section 1832, as amended by subsection (c), by adding at the end the following:

(d) Incitement or solicitation of theft of trade secrets

(1) In general

It shall be unlawful for a person to solicit, command, induce, or otherwise endeavor to persuade another person to engage in an offense described in subsection (a) or (c).

(2) Penalties

Any person who violates paragraph (1) shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.

(1)

by striking that is substantially owned and inserting the following: “that is—

(A)

substantially owned; and

(2)

by adding at the end the following: “or

(B)

domiciled in a covered nation, as defined in section 4872 of title 10;