July 30, 2026
Mr. Markey introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
To promote democracy, defend human rights, and impose accountability on the Government of Turkey for systemic political repression, censorship, transnational repression, and violations of international law.
Section 1. Short title; table of contents
(a) Short title
This Act may be cited as the Turkey Human Rights Promotion Act of 2026
.
(b) Table of contents
The table of contents for this Act is as follows:
Sec. 2. Findings
Congress finds the following:
(1)
The United States values its longstanding alliance with the Republic of Turkey, its friendship with the Turkish people, and remains committed to supporting a healthy Turkish democracy.
(2)
Articles I and II of the North Atlantic Treaty require Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to conduct themselves in a manner that promotes peace abroad and strengthens democratic institutions at home, affirming that the NATO alliance is founded on shared democratic principles.
(3)
The Republic of Turkey joined NATO in 1952, the first nation, along with Greece, to join the alliance after its founding.
(4)
Since the attempted coup in July 2016, the Government of Turkey has intensified its crackdown on freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly, and association. In its World 2026 assessment, Freedom House rated Turkey to be Not Free
.
(5)
In the years following the coup attempt, the Government of Turkey has pursued a sweeping and systematic campaign of domestic and transnational repression targeting journalists, academics, students, lawyers, opposition politicians, Kurds, Alevis, and individuals associated with the Hizmet (Gulen) Movement.
(6)
Since 2016, Turkish authorities have used vague and overly broad anti-terrorism laws to investigate more than 3,000,000 individuals for alleged terrorism-related offenses and to detain or arrest large numbers of people for peaceful civic or religious activities, according to the Stockholm Center for Freedom.
(7)
The Government of Turkey has used the failed 2016 coup as justification for a sweeping crackdown. In the immediate aftermath, authorities detained tens of thousands of people accused of aiding the coup or supporting terrorism and dismissed thousands of public employees. At least 4,156 judges and prosecutors and more than 5,800 academics were dismissed on terrorism-related grounds.
(8)
The April 2017 constitutional referendum, advanced by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and held under a state of emergency, shifted Turkey from a parliamentary to a presidential system, concentrating sweeping powers in the presidency. The Venice Commission warned that the amendments represent a dangerous step backwards
and risk the country’s degeneration into an authoritarian presidential system. Although the state of emergency formally ended in 2018, many emergency-era measures remain in force, and restrictions on fundamental freedoms persist.
(9)
According to the United States Department of State’s 2022 Human Rights Report, President Erdogan’s 2018 anti-terror legislation continues to restrict basic freedoms and undermine judicial independence. Since 2016, Turkish authorities have dismissed or suspended more than 60,000 police and military personnel, removed roughly 125,000 civil servants, purged approximately one-third of the judiciary, arrested or imprisoned more than 95,000 people, and closed over 1,500 nongovernmental organizations on terrorism-related grounds.
(10)
A 2020 Human Rights Watch report found that the Government of Turkey continues to arbitrarily detain and prosecute lawyers, in violation of its obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. According to the International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute and the Arrested Lawyers Initiative, more than 1,700 lawyers have been prosecuted, more than 700 were placed in pretrial detention, and at least 553 were collectively sentenced to more than 3,380 years in prison.
(11)
Turkey ranks 163 out of 180 countries in the 2026 World Press Freedom Index. The European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly found that Turkey unlawfully detains and prosecutes journalists. At least 314 journalists were tried in 2022 and 2023, and several journalists, including Hatice Duman, Mustafa Gok, and Erdal Susem, remain imprisoned for life. In the second quarter of 2025, authorities arrested 10 journalists and tried 103 journalists in 73 cases, resulting in 10 convictions.
(12)
According to Prison Insider, an estimated 43,000 political prisoners remain incarcerated in Turkey.
(13)
Arbitrary arrests and unfair trials persist as Turkey’s judiciary remains vulnerable to executive interference, with inconsistent and contradictory rulings from high courts. The case of civil society leader Osman Kavala, arrested in 2017 on unfounded charges, exemplifies this deterioration. Despite a 2019 binding ruling by the European Court of Human Rights ordering his release, Turkish courts have refused to comply. After briefly being acquitted, Kavala was rearrested on espionage charges and, in April 2022, sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, prompting Council of Europe infringement proceedings.
(14)
The Government of Turkey continues to detain Selahattin Demirtas, a leading Kurdish politician arrested in 2016. The European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly ruled that his detention is unlawful and ordered his immediate release, yet domestic courts have failed to enforce these judgments. In May 2024, Demirtas was sentenced to 42 years in prison on politically motivated charges related to the 2014 Kobani protests.
(15)
The Government of Turkey continues to detain political opposition leaders like Ekrem Imamoğlu, the Mayor of Istanbul and President Erdogan’s primary political opponent, on bogus corruption, bribery, and money laundering charges. Since March 2025, President Erdogan’s administration has escalated a crackdown on political opposition, resulting in the arrest of more than 500 people.
(16)
The Government of Turkey continues to censor online expression, prosecuting thousands for social media activity, including for liking or sharing posts. Authorities routinely block online content and have restricted access to major platforms during periods of political unrest. In 2024, Turkey blocked more than 311,000 web addresses, contributing to a total of over 1,264,000 websites and domains blocked since 2007.
(17)
President Erdogan’s 2023 reelection extended more than two decades of AKP dominance characterized by restrictions on assembly, association, expression, and electoral interference, as documented by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Between 2021 and 2023, the Constitutional Court considered a case seeking to ban a major pro-Kurdish party, sharply limiting its ability to campaign. Authorities continue to use disinformation and anti-terrorism laws to target political opponents, and ahead of the 2023 elections, courts compelled X (formerly Twitter) to remove numerous accounts and hundreds of posts.
(18)
In October 2022, the Government of Turkey amended its internet, press, and penal code laws to create a vague new offense, public dissemination of misleading information
, and expanded state authority over online speech. Social media companies that do not comply with government demands face severe fines and bandwidth throttling. These amendments enable prison sentences of up to three years and have resulted in arrests, including the detention of 78 individuals in February 2023, for criticizing the government’s earthquake response.
(19)
Following the February 2023 earthquake, authorities restricted access to X and other major platforms for as long as 12 hours, hindering rescue coordination and humanitarian response. Similar restrictions followed the 2022 Istanbul bombing, demonstrating the government’s readiness to impose information controls during crises.
(20)
The Radio and Television Supreme Council continues to impose arbitrary fines and broadcast suspensions on critical media outlets. Foreign outlets, including Deutsche Welle and Voice of America, had their Turkish-language websites blocked after refusing to comply with restrictive licensing and censorship requirements.
(21)
The October 2022 amendments also threaten the security of private messaging services. Regulations issued by the Information and Communication Technologies Authority (BTK) require providers to allow government access to user communications, undermining cybersecurity safeguards and expanding surveillance authorities.
(22)
The Government of Turkey continues to target LGBTQIA+ people and restrict peaceful demonstrations. According to ILGA–Europe’s 2026 rainbow map, Turkey ranks 47th out of 50 European countries for LGBTQIA+ equality. Turkey also has the highest recorded number of murders of transgender people in Europe. Authorities enforce nationwide bans on pride events and have used violent tactics and mass detentions to suppress such events. A draft bill, which was introduced in October 2025, would criminalize behavior contrary to biological sex,
raise the age for gender-affirming surgery, and impose prison terms of up to 4 years for same-sex marriage or civil-union ceremonies.
(23)
In March 2021, Turkey withdrew from the Istanbul Convention, a landmark human rights treaty of the Council of Europe designed to prevent violence against women. Legal experts state that this withdrawal violates both domestic and international law and reflects broader efforts to roll back protections for women, LGBTQIA+ people, and fundamental freedoms.
(24)
Since 2014, the Government of Turkey has increasingly targeted critics beyond its borders, including in the United States. Freedom House reports that Turkish authorities have pursued opponents in more than 31 countries and secured the rendition of at least 58 individuals without due process.
(25)
Following the 2016 coup attempt, the Government of Turkey escalated its campaign of transnational repression, forcibly returning or abducting more than 100 individuals, primarily educators linked to Hizmet-affiliated schools. Turkish authorities have pressured foreign governments to transfer or close these schools and have repeatedly abused INTERPOL Red Notices and diffusions to pursue dissidents abroad.
(26)
Turkish-Americans and lawful permanent residents in the United States have reported threats, intimidation, and harassment linked to politicized Turkish government blacklists.
Sec. 3. Definitions
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees
The term appropriate congressional committees means—
(A)
the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(B)
the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2) Political prisoner
The term political prisoner means a person who has been deprived of his or her personal liberty if—
(A)
the detention has been imposed in violation of one of the fundamental guarantees set out in the European Convention on Human Rights, particularly—
(i)
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion;
(ii)
freedom of expression and information; and
(iii)
freedom of assembly and association;
(B)
the detention has been imposed for purely political reasons without connection to any offense;
(C)
for political motives, the length of the detention or its conditions are clearly out of proportion to the offense of which the person has been found guilty or is suspected;
(D)
for political motives, he or she is detained in a discriminatory manner as compared to other persons; or
(E)
the detention is the result of proceedings which were clearly unfair and appear to be connected with political motives of the authorities.
(3) Prisoner of conscience
The term prisoner of conscience means any person who—
(A)
is imprisoned or otherwise physically restricted solely for the peaceful exercise of the individual's human rights; and
(B)
has not used violence or advocated violence or hatred.
Sec. 4. Statement of policy
It is the policy of the United States—
(1)
to support democracy, peace, and human rights in Turkey, and to press the Government of Turkey to comply with its obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty;
(2)
to oppose the abuse of counterterrorism laws and authorities, including targeting journalists, political opponents, dissidents, recognized and unrecognized ethnic and religious minorities, and others engaged in exercising their right to freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly, or association;
(3)
to consider those detained or imprisoned under counterterrorism authorities on politically motivated grounds to be prisoners of conscience or political prisoners, as appropriate, unless there is probative evidence of specific criminal misconduct presented in proceedings that comply with international fair trial standards;
(4)
to use all diplomatic tools to advocate that all prisoners of conscience and political prisoners in Turkey should be unconditionally released and charges expunged;
(5)
to press the Government of Turkey to repeal or amend—
(A)
all anti-terrorism laws and regulations that allow the government to unjustly target journalists, political opponents, dissidents, and minorities;
(B)
all laws and regulations that violate the right to freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly, or association in a manner not permitted by international legal standards, including laws and regulations that seek to punish those who insult political figures or denigrate the Turkish nation or state institutions; and
(C)
all laws and regulations that violate the right to a fair trial;
(6)
to oppose the export to Turkey by any country of surveillance technologies, including software, that could be used to monitor the activities of journalists, political opponents, dissidents, or minority communities;
(7)
to condemn the Government of Turkey’s use of transnational repression, including the abuse of INTERPOL notices, renditions, and other extraterritorial measures to target critics abroad;
(8)
to protect United States persons and lawful permanent residents from harassment, intimidation, and other forms of foreign political retaliation by or on behalf of the Government of Turkey; and
(9)
to condition United States security cooperation and assistance, as appropriate, on measurable improvements in respect for human rights, rule of law, and compliance with binding international human rights judgments.
Sec. 5. Sense of Congress on press freedom
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1)
the Government of Turkey must take steps to significantly improve the dire climate for journalists and those supporting the journalism profession, including—
(A)
ending the enforcement of draconian laws and regulations that restrict freedom of expression; and
(B)
releasing unconditionally all journalists and media workers who have been imprisoned for fulfilling their professional responsibilities;
(2)
the Department of State should provide assistance and warnings of impending politically motivated detention or harm to journalists and media workers in danger in Turkey, regardless of citizenship status, including journalists working for Kurdish media organizations;
(3)
United States Government officials should prioritize demands to release unfairly detained journalists and media workers in their communications with Turkish officials; and
(4)
press freedom and the freedom of expression are fundamental human rights and should be upheld and protected in Turkey and everywhere where those rights are threatened.
Sec. 6. Sense of Congress on internet freedom
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1)
the Government of Turkey must cease its ongoing crackdown on free expression on the internet, including by repealing or amending laws allowing the government to block a website or remove content from the website if there is sufficient suspicion that the site is insulting political figures;
(2)
the Department of State should support and pressure the Government of Turkey—
(A)
to halt its frequent requests that social media companies block accounts and content of journalists and media outlets; and
(B)
to ensure that the Radio and Television Supreme Council does not arbitrarily restrict online streaming services through a costly and opaque licensing regime; and
(3)
escalating controls regulating internet use are an attempt by the Government of Turkey to silence one of the last platforms for independent journalism in the country.
Sec. 7. Sense of Congress on protecting lawyers and promoting fair trials
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1)
the Government of Turkey must—
(A)
halt its indiscriminate detention and prosecution of lawyers, judges, prosecutors, and court officials, and its targeting of lawyers’ associations;
(B)
repeal laws restricting the right of lawyers to discharge their professional duties, the rights of suspects to legal counsel, and the right of lawyer-client privileged communication;
(C)
ensure that lawyers can visit detainees in police custody, and remind police and prosecutors of the protected role of lawyers under Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Articles 5 and 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and the United Nations Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers; and
(D)
end the practice of prosecuting lawyers based on whom they have represented as clients;
(2)
the Department of State should pressure the Government of Turkey—
(A)
to abolish extended pretrial detention, consistent with Turkey’s Judicial Reform Strategy;
(B)
to reverse the April 2017 amendment to Article 159 of the Constitution of Turkey, which allows for political control over the nomination procedures to the Council of Judges and Prosecutors; and
(C)
to ensure the independence of judges and of the judiciary system, with particular focus on the Ministry of Justice; and
(3)
the independence of any country’s judicial system suffers when lawyers—
(A)
are subject to intimidation and harassment in their work; and
(B)
are identified with the causes of their clients.
Sec. 8. Sense of Congress on accountability for human rights violations
It is the sense of Congress that if the Government of Turkey does not promptly take effective steps to address the human rights violations described in this Act—
(1)
the President of the United States should impose sanctions pursuant to the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) with respect to officials of the Government of Turkey determined to be responsible for or complicit in, or to have directly or indirectly engaged in—
(A)
the detention of prisoners of conscience and political prisoners;
(B)
the politically motivated detention of journalists;
(C)
restricting of freedom of free expression through social media; and
(D)
other gross violations of internationally recognized human rights;
(2)
the President should confirm that United States security assistance provided to the Government of Turkey is fully consistent with the conditions mandated in section 36 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2776) and the human rights provisions contained in section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d);
(3)
the Secretary of the Treasury should instruct the United States executive director of each international financial institution to oppose any loan, grant, policy, or strategy determined to be directly enabling the Government of Turkey to violate the human rights of its citizens; and
(4)
the Secretary of State should impose visa restrictions under the announced Khashoggi Ban
, pursuant to section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(C)) on—
(A)
individuals who, acting on behalf of the government, are believed to have been directly engaged in serious, extraterritorial counter-dissident activities, including those who—
(i)
suppress, harass, surveil, threaten, or harm journalists, activists, or other persons perceived to be dissidents for their work; or
(ii)
engage in such activities with respect to the families or other close associates of such persons; and
(B)
family members of individuals described in subparagraph (A), as appropriate.
Sec. 9. Limitations on certain security assistance
(a) In general
No funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for Foreign Military Financing, Foreign Military Sales, or other security assistance programs for the Government of Turkey may be obligated or expended unless the Secretary of State certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the Government of Turkey—
(1)
has taken demonstrable and sustained steps to reduce the number of prisoners of conscience and political prisoners, including by releasing individuals detained solely for the peaceful exercise of their human rights;
(2)
has ceased the misuse of counterterrorism and disinformation laws to criminalize peaceful expression, association, and political participation;
(3)
is taking concrete steps to comply with binding judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, including in cases concerning Osman Kavala and Selahattin Demirtaş; and
(4)
has ceased, or is no longer systematically engaging in, acts of transnational repression targeting individuals abroad for exercising their fundamental freedoms.
(b) Waiver
The Secretary of State may waive the application of subsection (a) on a case-by-case basis if the Secretary determines and reports to the appropriate congressional committees that such waiver is in the vital national security interest of the United States, and includes a justification for the waiver and a description of efforts to promote the reforms described in subsection (a).
Sec. 10. Political prisoners assistance
The Secretary of State shall provide assistance to civil society organizations in Turkey that work to secure the release of prisoners of conscience and political prisoners in Turkey, and to current and former prisoners of conscience and political prisoners in Turkey, including—
(1)
support for the documentation of human rights violations with respect to prisoners of conscience and politically motivated prisoners;
(2)
support for advocacy in Turkey to raise awareness of issues relating to prisoners of conscience and political prisoners;
(3)
support for efforts to repeal or amend laws or regulations that are used to imprison individuals as prisoners of conscience or political prisoners; and
(4)
the delegation of specific United States mission staff who will observe trials in politically motivated cases, including in Southeast Turkey.
Sec. 11. Annual report
(a) In general
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the implementation of this Act.
(b) Matters To be included
Each report required under subsection (a) shall include—
(1)
an assessment of the number, conditions, and legal status of prisoners of conscience and political prisoners in Turkey;
(2)
a description of restrictions on freedom of expression, association, assembly, and the press, including online censorship and blocking of social media platforms and websites;
(3)
a description of incidents of transnational repression, including renditions, attempted abductions, physical attacks, or misuse of INTERPOL notices targeting individuals in other countries, including the United States;
(4)
an assessment of any use by the Government of Turkey of United States-origin goods, services, or technologies to facilitate surveillance, censorship, or other serious human rights abuses;
(5)
a description of efforts by the Government of Turkey to restrict and repress political opposition parties and leaders, including attempts to eliminate meaningful political disagreement and debate;
(6)
a description of efforts by the Government of Turkey to amend the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey to marginalize political opposition and consolidate power around one political party or politician; and
(7)
a description of the sanctions, visa restrictions, and other measures taken pursuant to this Act and other applicable authorities.
Sec. 12. Support for civil society and independent media
The Secretary of State and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, as appropriate, shall expand support for—
(1)
independent journalists and media outlets in Turkey, including those operating in exile;
(2)
civil society organizations documenting human rights violations or providing assistance to victims of politically motivated persecution;
(3)
digital rights advocates and organizations working to enhance secure communications, privacy, and cybersecurity for at-risk communities; and
(4)
initiatives promoting human rights education, legal literacy, and public awareness regarding fundamental freedoms in Turkey.